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I. INTRODUCTION 
 On June 19, 2016, the international community marked the first 
International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict. 
This day aims to raise awareness of the devastating reality of this 
violence, to stand in solidarity with the victims and to acknowledge 
those working to address this violence. The date was chosen to 
commemorate the June 19, 2008 adoption of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1820, a landmark resolution in which the 
Security Council stressed that sexual violence could significantly 
exacerbate conflicts and impede peace processes.1 Most importantly, 
this resolution called for prosecutions of those responsible for such 
acts and highlighted the need to end impunity “as part of a 
comprehensive approach to seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth, 
and national reconciliation.”2 
Criminal prosecutions provide an important measure of redress for 
victims of mass atrocities. 3  They also fulfill a broader purpose: to 
help build and restore peace and the rule of law. Prosecutions are 
necessary to demonstrate the intolerance for violations of human 
rights in peacetime. This is particularly important in the case of 
sexual violence. Impunity for sexual violence reverberates in homes 
and on the streets, and contributes to these crimes being viewed as 
less serious.4 When sexual violence is not addressed, it is 
1.    See S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008). 
 2.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 3.  Serge Brammertz & Michelle Jarvis, Lessons Learned in Prosecuting 
Gender Crimes under International Law: Experiences from the ICTY, in 
PROTECTING HUMANITY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY IN HONOUR 
OF NAVANETHEM PILLAY 95, 113 (Chile Eboe-Osuji ed., 2010). 
 4.  JELKE BOESTEN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING WAR AND PEACE: GENDER, 
POWER AND POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE IN PERU 99 (2014); see Romi Sigsworth & 
Nahla Valji, Continuities of Violence against Women and the Limitations of 
Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa, in GENDER IN TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 115, 119-20 (Susanne Buckley-Zistel & Ruth Stanley eds., 2012) (noting 
that “how a post-conflict society deals with sexual violence, in particular rape and 
rape victims, directly affects the gender regimes (re)established in peacetime”, and 
arguing that it is necessary to recognize the continuities of violence during and 
after conflict when developing mechanisms of redress in post-conflict contexts.).  
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‘normalized’ in post-conflict contexts, often resulting in increased 
levels of violence against women.5 Accountability for these crimes is 
therefore critical to building a more just society and to redirecting the 
shame and stigma suffered by victims towards the perpetrators.6 
This paper examines the progress made in establishing 
accountability for sexual violence committed in the internal conflicts 
of Peru, Guatemala, and Colombia. The common ways in which 
sexual violence occurred and has been responded to in the three 
countries provide useful lessons for domestic practitioners in other 
jurisdictions. These countries share common social and cultural 
factors influencing the prevalence of sexual and gender-based 
violence, specifically against women and girls. In particular, the 
intersecting inequalities of gender, race and class played a key role in 
rendering certain communities particularly vulnerable to this 
 5.  See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
implementation of Security Council resolutions 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009), ¶14, 
U.N. Doc. A/65/592-S/2010/604 (Nov. 24, 2010) (reporting “[i]n Haiti, the use of 
rape as a tool of intimidation by the de facto military regime (1991- 2004) 
reportedly “normalized” a cycle of violence against women that has been 
replicated by criminal elements.”); Progress of the World’s Women: In Pursuit of 
Justice, U.N. WOMEN 84 (2011), http://www2.unwomen.org/~/media/ 
headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2011/progressoftheworldsw
omen-2011-en.pdf?v=1&d=20150402T222835 (indicating that “as demobilized 
combatants return home, post-conflict contexts are often characterized by ongoing 
and sometimes increased levels of violence and insecurity for women”); Care and 
Protection of Children in Crisis Affected Countries: A Good Practice Policy 
Change Initiative, CPC NETWORK, 20 (2008), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_ 
docs/Pnado992.pdf (documenting the high rates of gender-based violence in 
Liberia four years after the end of the conflict); “Now, the World is without Me”: 
An Investigation of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 
OXFAM, 2, 19, 39-40 (Apr. 2010), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/DRC-sexual-
violence-2010-04.pdf [hereinafter “Now, the World is without Me”] (analyzing a 
17-fold increase in civilian rapes in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
between 2004 and 2008 and a significant decrease in rapes by combatants, and 
arguing that these rates show a reversal in society’s norms and values due to 
ongoing impunity). 
 6.  See Gabriela Mischkowski, Address at The Bangladesh Genocide and the 
Issue of Justice International Conference, Heidelberg, The Trouble with Rape 
Trials – The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict from the 
Perspectives of Female Witnesses (July 4-5, 2013) (arguing that “to prosecute the 
wrongdoers means to affirm that wrong was indeed done. It means to show 
solidarity with the victims and to revoke solidarity from those who committed the 
crimes.”). 
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violence in conflict.7 These factors have also contributed to the 
persistent lack of attention these crimes have received from justice 
authorities in the post-conflict periods. Although conflict-related 
sexual violence has historically rarely been prosecuted, and impunity 
remains high, legal practitioners have begun to use international law 
to establish accountability for sexual violence in each country. The 
different legal and evidentiary approaches applied in sexual violence 
cases have been informed by the practice and jurisprudence of 
international and regional human rights and criminal courts. Finally, 
in all three countries, women’s and victims groups have played a key 
role in calling on authorities to ensure justice, truth and reparation for 
victims. Victims have participated and exercised their rights both as 
witnesses and as civil parties in trial proceedings. 
This paper has two parts. Part I explains the context in which 
sexual violence occurred in each conflict. It discusses the prevalence 
of sexual violence, its diverse manifestations, the categories of 
victims, and the perpetrators. It also discusses how authorities in 
each country have documented and responded to sexual violence. 
Part II focuses on how international law is being used to prosecute 
conflict-related sexual violence in each country. It examines the 
existing legal frameworks and analyzes how these frameworks are 
being applied to charge and prove sexual violence crimes, and to 
establish criminal liability. The paper concludes with reflections on 
how the experiences of Guatemala, Peru and Colombia can be used 
by other national systems seeking to establish accountability for 
these crimes. 
II. SURFACING GENDERED NARRATIVES OF 
VIOLENCE 
To move forward as a society, it is important to acknowledge past 
violations.8 How a society narrates and commemorates its past will 
influence its path towards a peaceful future.9 When reflecting on the 
 7.  See discussion infra Part I.  
 8.  See Katherine M. Franke, Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice, 15 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 813, 823 (2006) (observing that “among the greatest 
challenges of transitional justice [is to] honor the injuries and crimes of the past 
while creating the possibilities for new ways of being in the future”).   
 9.  See Online Debate: Does Collective Remembrance of a Troubled Past 
Impede Reconciliation, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. (May 4, 2016), 
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past, we must take into account the gendered dimensions of 
violations. We have come a long way in acknowledging that while 
everyone suffers during periods of armed conflict and repressive 
regimes, “this suffering takes varied forms and gender is one of the 
influencing factors.”10 Failing to take into account the distinct 
experiences of women and men, girls and boys, in conflict results in 
incomplete narratives of violence and renders the gendered aspects 
of violations invisible. 
This section outlines the picture of sexual violence in each 
conflict. Evidence of these crimes first came to light through truth 
seeking and historical memory processes. The truth commission 
reports addressing human rights abuses in the conflicts in Guatemala 
and Peru revealed brutal sexual violence, in particular against women 
from indigenous and rural communities.11 In Colombia, reports from 
human rights organizations and the Constitutional Court’s rulings 
highlighted the extensive amount of sexual violence perpetrated by 
armed actors in the conflict, the different categories of victims and 
the multiple uses of this violence.12 These documentation efforts 
played an important role in making visible the nature, scale and 
patterns of sexual violence in each conflict. They also marked a 
turning point in the perception of these crimes and generated great 
expectations regarding their prosecution, which were not always met. 
The findings regarding the legal characterization of crimes and those 
responsible also influenced the approaches later adopted by legal 
https://www.ictj.org/news/online-debate-remembrance-reconciliation (providing 
opinions for and against collective remembrance). 
 10.  Brammertz & Jarvis, supra note 3, at 97-98 (noting that “over the past 
decade, the impact of armed conflict on women has become a significant item on 
the UN’s agenda”). 
 11.  See generally COMISIÓN DE ESCLARECIMIENTO HISTÓRICO, GUATEMALA: 
MEMORIA DE SILENCIO (1999), http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/ 
descargas/guatemala-memoria-silencio/guatemala-memoria-del-silencio.pdf  
[hereinafter CEH Final Report] (addressing gross sexual violence abuses, 
specifically against Mayans); Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación [Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission], Informe Final [Final Report] (2003), 
http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/ [hereinafter CVR Final Report] (focusing on sexual 
violence perpetrated during the Peruvian conflict). 
 12.  See generally Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad, 
CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA Ch. 2 (2013), 
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/bas
ta-ya-colombia-memorias-de-guerra-y-dignidad-2016.pdf [hereinafter Historical 
Memory Group 2013]. 
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practitioners to address this violence. 
A. GUATEMALA 
The 36-year long civil war in Guatemala (1960-1996) took a 
tremendous toll on the civilian population, a toll that included 
widespread sexual violence.13 The conflict involved right-wing 
government forces and various left-wing guerrilla groups seeking 
democratic reforms and social justice. From the mid-1960s onwards, 
within the context of its counterinsurgency campaign, Guatemalan 
government forces unleashed a violent campaign against the civilian 
population, mainly targeting the Mayan and peasant Ladino 
communities.14 
The 1994 Oslo Agreement between the government and the 
guerilla established the Commission for Historical Clarification 
(Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, CEH), tasked with 
documenting human rights abuses in the conflict.15 Despite its 
gender-neutral mandate, the CEH decided to include a gender 
analysis in its 1999 Final Report, uncovering a larger truth that 
included women’s experiences.16 The Commission found that the 
 13.  See Amandine Fulchiron et al., Weavings of the Soul: Memories of Mayan 
Women Survivors of Sexual Violence During the Armed Conflict, IDRC (2009) 
(providing a gendered analysis of the Guatemalan conflict and its impact on Mayan 
women). 
 14.  See CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at Ch. 1; RODDY BRETT, THE 
ORIGINS AND DYNAMICS OF GENOCIDE: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN GUATEMALA 122-
38 (2016) (analyzing in detail the government’s counterinsurgency campaign and 
its impact).  
 15.  See Recuperacion de la Memoria Historia, Conflict Research Consortium 
Book Summary: Proyecto Interdiocesano Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica 
(Guatemala), OTPIC, http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/remhi.htm 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Conflict Research Consortium Book 
Summary] (stating that the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH)−whose mandate covered the period from the start of the armed conflict to 
the signing of the peace agreement in 1996−based its investigations, analysis and 
findings on a report, Never Again, published by an unofficial precursor to the CEH, 
the Recovery of Historical Memory (Recuperación de la Memoria 
Historica−REMHI), led by the Human Rights Office of the Catholic Archdiocese); 
see also MEMORY OF SILENCE: THE GUATEMALAN TRUTH COMMISSION REPORT 
(Rothenberg ed., 2012) (providing an edited English version of the CEH’s final 
report).  
 16.  The CEH published its final report on 25 February 1999. See Vasuki 
Nesiah et al., Truth Commissions and Gender: Principles, Policies, and 
Procedures, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 41 (July 2006) (highlighting the 
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government-led counterinsurgency campaign resulted in gross 
human rights abuses against civilians, as well as in the genocide of 
various Mayan communities in four regions of the country.17 It also 
found that state agents perpetrated widespread and systematic sexual 
violence as part of its counterinsurgency campaign.18 The CEH 
documented 1465 cases of sexual violence, including cases of rape, 
sexual slavery and torture.19 In addition, it identified two modalities 
of rape: selective rapes (which targeted specific victims, such as 
female human rights defenders and female detainees) and massive 
rapes (referring to the indiscriminate and systematic use of rape 
alongside other violations, for example during attacks on Mayan 
villages).20 Regarding ethnicity, 88 per cent of victims of sexual 
violence were Mayan, 10 per cent were Ladina and 1 per cent 
belonged to other groups.21 While the main focus of the CEH’s 
report was on female victims, it acknowledged the existence of cases 
of male sexual violence.22 The CEH concluded that, along with 
torture, rape was one of the human rights violations that most 
importance of addressing gender violence and providing strategies for future truth 
commissions to analyze this issue).  
 17.  See CEH Final Report, supra note 11, Section IX at ¶¶ 1731-57 (Statistical 
summary); see also CEH Final Report, supra note 11, Section XVIII at ¶ 2901 
(Violations against the Rights of Existence, Integrity and Cultural Identity of 
Indigenous Peoples); CEH Final Report, supra note 11, Section XXI (Genocide) 
(determining that over 200,000 Guatemalans were killed in the conflict, mostly of 
Mayan ethnicity, and the repression was so overwhelming it reached the definition 
of genocide); BRETT, supra note 14, at 141 (arguing that “the genocide strategy 
represented, at least in the short term, an effective and successful policy decision 
through which to eliminate the threat of revolution and impede the transformation 
of Guatemala’s oligarchic social order into a land ruled by subversives, ‘indians’ 
and primitives.”).  
 18.  See CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 2351, 2393 (Sexual Violence 
against Women). These acts were not isolated but part of a planned strategy by 
government forces. See also CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 2398, 2476-
78. 
 19.  CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at ¶ 2388 (Sexual Violence against 
Women). 
 20.  See id. at ¶¶ 2401-12, 2469-2477, 2479 (Sexual Violence against Women). 
The CEH highlighted that the type of harm inflicted on the victims was determined 
by their gender. For example, during massacres, government forces would separate 
men and women. While both groups would be killed, the women were raped prior 
to being killed. 
 21.  Id. at ¶ 2390. 
 22.  See id. at ¶ 2351, 2376 (Fig. 1: percentage of documented violations by 
sex). 
 
KRAVETZ- FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2017  12:40 PM 
714 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:3 
contributed to generating and maintaining state terror during the 
conflict, and that it was committed with the intention to destroy the 
victims’ identity and dignity in a profound way.23 
Justice for conflict-related crimes, in particular for sexual 
violence, has been elusive in the years following the end to 
Guatemala’s civil war. With a troubled history of violence against 
women, crimes of sexual violence have largely remained 
unpunished, and victims have faced significant barriers to access 
justice.24 To break the silence surrounding these crimes, a Tribunal 
of Conscience for Women Survivors of Sexual Violence during the 
Armed Conflict in Guatemala was held on 4-5 March 2010 in 
Guatemala City.25 This civil society initiative was organized by 
different women’s and survivors’ organizations seeking to push for 
accountability for these crimes, and it marked an important moment 
in the truth-telling process of past crimes. Its main objectives were to 
allow women to speak about sexual violence they had suffered 
during the conflict, to raise awareness of issues of justice and redress 
for women survivors within their communities, and to prepare the 
groundwork for these crimes to be prosecuted domestically.26 Since 
then, two court cases, the Ríos Montt and the Sepur Zarco cases, 
have addressed sexual violence crimes, with different outcomes. 
The Ríos Montt case was the first domestic trial against a former 
head of state for crimes of genocide.27 In May 2013, the High Risk 
 23.  See MEMORY OF SILENCE: THE GUATEMALAN TRUTH COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 15, at 153 (explaining the consequences of torture and rape); 
see also CEH Final Report, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 2482-83 (Sexual Violence against 
Women) (noting the profound impact of sexual violence on the victims and their 
communities). 
 24.  See, e.g., Alison Crosby & M. Brinton Lykes, Mayan Women Survivors 
Speak: The Gendered Relations of Truth Telling in Postwar Guatemala, 5 INT’L J. 
TRANSNATIONAL JUST. 456, 457-58 (2011) (highlighting the role of Guatemalan 
civil society in pushing for accountability for sexual violence in response to 
entrenched impunity and weak state response).  
 25.  See id. at 456-76 (explaining the Tribunal’s structure and purpose). The 
tribunal was organized as a mock trial, with prosecutors, judges and testimonies of 
women survivors and experts.  
 26.  See id. at 457. 
 27.  See Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos contra 
el Medioambiente [First Tribunal for Crime, Drug Trafficking and Environmental 
Offences], “José Mauricio Rodríguez y José Efraín Ríos Montt,”, C-01076-2011-
00015 (Guat.) [hereinafter Ríos Montt case]. A separate but related case against 
Ríos Montt and others was brought in Spain under the Spanish law for universal 
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Tribunal “A” found José Efraín Ríos Montt, former president of 
Guatemala, guilty for committing genocide against the Mayan Ixil 
population during his de facto 1982-1983 rule and for crimes against 
the duties of humanity, sentencing him to 80 years in prison.28 His 
co-accused and former chief of military intelligence, José Mauricio 
Rodríguez Sánchez, was acquitted.29 The trial was marred with 
challenges by the defence.30 The conviction against Ríos Montt was 
short-lived, as just a few days later in a controversial ruling, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that his due process rights had been 
violated and invalidated the proceedings, effectively vacating the 
judgment.31 After several false starts, a retrial against both accused 
jurisdiction. In 1999, Mayan activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta 
Menchú and others filed a lawsuit before the Spanish National Court against Ríos 
Montt and others for crimes of genocide, terrorism and torture. In June 2011, two 
NGOs, the Center for Justice and Accountability and Women’s Link Worldwide, 
filed a request before the Spanish National Court for the charges to be revised to 
include crimes of sexual violence, and presented the evidence of two expert 
witnesses. Although the Constitutional Court of Guatemala has declared that Spain 
lacks jurisdiction in this case, and has not complied with arrests warrants issued by 
Spain, the case in Spain remains open. See Genocidio en Guatemala: Ríos Montt 
Culpable, FIDH, 6-7 (2013), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/informe_ 
guatemala613esp2013.pdf; see also Incorporación de los Crímenes de Género en 
el Caso del Genocidio Guatemalteco (1960-1996), WOMEN’S LINK WORLDWIDE 
(Aug. 5, 2011), http://www2.womenslinkworldwide.org/wlw/new.php?modo= 
detalle_proyectos&dc=22. 
 28.  Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el 
Medioambiente [First Tribunal for Crime, Drug Trafficking and Environmental 
Offences], 10/5/2013, “José Mauricio Rodríguez y José Efraín Ríos Montt,” C-
01076-2011-00015, 702-705 (Guat.) [hereinafter Ríos Montt Judgment]. 
 29.  See id, at ¶¶ 702-05. 
 30.  See Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala’s Ríos Montt, OPEN 
SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE, 9-11 (2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ 
sites/default/files/judging-dicatator-trial-guatemala-rios-montt-11072013.pdf 
(criticizing the defense’s excessive use of “amparos” or habeas corpus writs to 
challenge constitutional or legal rights); see also Marco Antonio Canteo, Impactos 
del juicio por genocidio en el sistema de justicia de Guatemala, in RETOS 
ACTUALES DE LA JUSTICIA POR CRÍMENES DEL PASADO (REVISTA DE LA 
FUNDACIÓN PARA EL DEBIDO PROCESO (DPLF)) 47-48 (2013) (noting that the 
defense was allowed to abuse the legal process and filed numerous motions and 
challenges). 
 31.  See Emi MacLean, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court Overturns Rios 
Montt Conviction and Sends Trial Back to April 19, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (May 
21, 2013), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/05/constitutional-court-overturns-rios-
montt-conviction-and-sends-trial-back-to-april-19/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) 
(overturning the ruling based on Montt’s challenge that the appellate court’s order 
was not fully complied with by the trial court, even though the appellate court 
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began in March 2016.32 In 2015, Ríos Montt had been declared unfit 
to stand trial, so the retrial was unlikely to result in a conviction 
against him and the proceedings were held behind closed doors.33 
The civil parties challenged the legality of these proceedings and 
argued that Rodríguez Sánchez should be tried separately and 
publicly. In June 2016, the Appeals Court granted the request by the 
civil parties and suspended the trial indefinitely.34 The future of the 
case is now uncertain. It exemplifies the weakness of the Guatemalan 
justice system in providing redress to victims, in particular in cases 
involving high-level accused.35 
The Sepur Zarco judgment marks a historic precedent that breaks 
recognized the trial court as having fully complied); see also Mike McDonald, 
Guatemala’s Top Court Annuls Rios Montt Genocide Conviction, REUTERS (May 
21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-riosmontt-
idUSBRE94K04I20130521 (explaining the trial should be suspended until all 
challenges in the case have been settled). 
 32.  See Jo-Marie Burt, Ríos Montt Genocide Retrial Starts Amidst 
Controversy, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Mar. 21, 2016), 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/03/rios-montt-genocide-retrial-starts-amidst-
controversy/ (discussing the procedural background to the restart of the 
proceedings and the challenges raised by civil parties to the legality of the 
proceedings). 
 33.  See Sophie Beaudoin, Court Orders Rios Montt and Rodriguez Sanchez 
Retrial to Begin in January 2016, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Aug. 26, 2015), 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/08/court-orders-rios-montt-and-rodriguez-sanchez-
retrial-to-begin-in-january-2016/ [hereinafter Rios Montt and Rodriguez Sanchez 
Retrial] (explaining the legal basis in Guatemalan law for the special procedure 
applied in this case). 
 34.  See Jo-Marie Burt, Appeals Court Upholds Suspension of Ríos Montt 
Genocide Trial, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (June 3, 2016), 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/06/appeals-court-upholds-suspension-of-rios-
montt-genocide-trial/ (noting that the civil parties argued that conducting a trial 
under an illegal format would likely result in a mistrial or a suspension of the 
proceedings); see also Manuela Cencetti, La Dignidad Ixil Mantiene la Esperanza 
de un Juicio por el Genocido en Guatemala, DIAGONAL (May 19, 2016), 
https://www.diagonalperiodico.net/global/30405-guatemala-efrain-rios-montt-
testigos-nebaj-genocidio-ixil.html. 
 35.  Cf. Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala’s Rios Montt, supra note 
30, at 2, n.10 (explaining that before the trial of Ríos Montt, almost “all the nearly 
30 people convicted for crimes committed during the country’s internal armed 
conflict were low-level soldiers, police, paramilitaries, or members of the civilian 
patrols established by the military” and highlighting the exception of the 
conviction of former military commissioner, Felipe Cusanero, in August 2009 for 
forced disappearance); Canteo, supra note 30, at 48 (noting that the Rios Montt 
trial made evident the weaknesses in the Guatemalan justice system). 
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with the entrenched impunity for sexual violence.36 It is the first case 
in Guatemala to focus primarily on sexual violence crimes against 
indigenous women perpetrated during the country’s internal conflict. 
The crimes took place in Sepur Zarco, a small Mayan Q’eqchi’ 
community located in eastern Guatemala. This community suffered 
extreme repression during the conflict, particularly during the 1980s. 
The case concerns crimes of rape, sexual and domestic slavery, 
murder, and cruel and degrading treatment perpetrated by the 
military stationed outside the village. The case arose from a lawsuit 
filed in 2011 by two Guatemalan women’s rights organizations, 
Women Transforming the World (Mujeres Transformando el 
Mundo) and the National Union of Guatemalan Women (Unión 
Nacional de Mujeres Guatemaltecas), who are co-representing a 
group of victims. The accused are the former commander of the 
Sepur Zarco military base, retired lieutenant colonel Esteelmer 
Francisco Reyes Girón, and the former military commissioner in the 
area, Heriberto Valdez Asig.37 In 2014, the two accused were 
arrested in connection with these crimes,38 and they were tried and 
convicted of all charges in February 2016.39 The case is currently 
under appeal. Both cases are discussed in further detail in Part II. 
 36.  Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el 
Medioambiente [First Tribunal for Crime, Drug Trafficking and Environmental 
Offences], Feb. 26 2016, “Esteelmer Francisco Reyes Girón, Heriberto Valdez 
Asig”, C-01076-2012-00021 (Guat.) [hereinafter Sepur Zarco Judgment]. 
 37.  See Guatemala Makes History with a Landmark Military Sexual Violence 
Trial, WOLA (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.wola.org/2016/02/guatemala-makes-
history-with-a-landmark-military-sexual-violence-trial/ [hereinafter Guatemala 
Makes History] (noting this is the first time in Guatemala that crimes of sexual 
violence have been tried as international crimes); see also Monitoring Guatemala, 
2 Found Guilty in Historic Sepur Zarco Sexual Slavery Case, GHRC (Mar. 3, 
2016), https://ghrcusa.wordpress.com/tag/violence-against-women/. 
 38.  See Sepur Zarco Sexual Slavery Case, GUAT. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, 
http://www.ghrc-usa.org/our-work/important-cases/sepur-zarco/#sepurzarcohistory 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (providing a historical timeline of the developments in 
the case). 
 39.  See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 503, 507-08.  The Tribunal 
sentenced both accused to 30 years in prison. Valdez Asig was also sentenced to 
210 additional years in prison for the enforced disappearance of seven men, and 
Reyes Girón to an additional 90 years for the murder of three other women. See 
also Sophie Beaudoin, Sepur Zarco Trial to Start in February, INT’L JUST. 
MONITOR (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/11/sepur-zarco-trial-to-
start-in-february/ (summarizing the case’s history and expected testimony at the 
trial).  
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The victims in the Sepur Zarco and Ríos Montt cases showed 
incredible courage in challenging impunity for these crimes three 
decades after they occurred. Without their unwavering perseverance 
and advocacy, these cases would not have been possible. However, 
Guatemala’s progress in coming to terms with its violent past has 
been painfully slow.40 It remains to be seen whether these precedents 
will open the door to further prosecutions concerning sexual 
violence. 
B. PERU 
Peru’s twenty-year conflict began in the 1980s with violent 
insurgencies led by a left-wing rebel group known as Shining Path 
(Sendero Luminoso).41 During its crackdown on this armed group, 
the Peruvian state perpetrated systematic abuses against the civilian 
population, in particular against those suspected of collaborating 
with the rebels.42 Small, rural and indigenous communities of the 
Andes and Amazon were particularly affected by this violence.43 
The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de 
Verdad y Reconciliación, CVR), set up in 2001,44 made important 
inroads in identifying sexual violence as a human rights violation in 
the conflict and in recording individual cases.45 Up until the CVR’s 
 40.  See Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala’s Rios Montt, supra note 
30, at 1 (noting progress has been slow in Guatemala in prosecuting conflict-
related atrocities). 
 41.  See generally CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. I, Part I, Ch. 1, 59-
77.   
 42.  See id. at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1. 
 43.  See id. at Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.2.   
 44.  The CVR was established to investigate human rights abuses perpetrated 
between 1980 and 2000 by the State, the Shining Path and the Movimiento 
Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA). See Julissa Mantilla Falcón, La 
judicialización de la violencia sexual, PUENTES: EDICIÓN ESPECIAL 45 (June 
2015); see also CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at 25-27; Creación de la 
Comisión de la Verdad en el Perú, Decreto Supremo No. 065-200-PCM (June 4, 
2001); see also Modifican Denominación de la Comisión de la Verdad por la de la 
Comisión de la Verdad y Reconiliacion, Decreto Supremo No. 101-2001-PCM 
(Aug. 31, 2001). 
 45.  See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 277-
78, 343-44 (stating that during the conflict, there was a practice of sexual violence, 
mainly against women, perpetrated primarily by state agents and, to a lesser 
degree, by members of subversive groups. In examining the multiple purposes of 
this violence, the CVR concluded that these acts were aimed at punishing, 
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establishment, sexual violence crimes were considered isolated 
events, unconnected to the conflict, and the full scale of the 
phenomenon was unknown.46 Although not an official part of its 
mandate, the CVR paid particular attention to gender in its 2003 
Final Report.47 By interpreting its mandate broadly, it uncovered 
widespread sexual violence against women, “especially young, 
indigenous women, perpetrated by the army and the police.”48 It also 
uncovered ample evidence of sexual violence by the Shining Path, 
despite the group’s often-contradictory rhetoric against it.49 The 
intimidating, pressuring, and humiliating the population); see generally Katya 
Salazar Luzula, Gender, Sexual Violence and Criminal Law in Post-Conflict Peru, 
in THE LEGACY OF TRUTH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE PERUVIAN TRANSITION 56-69 
(Lisa Magarrell & Leonardo Filippini eds. 2006) (describing the work of the CVR 
in addressing sexual violence).  
 46.  See Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42; see also CVR Final Report, 
supra note 11, at Vol. IV, Part VI, Ch. 1.1.5, 275 (noting that one of the factors 
that contributed to rendering sexual violence invisible in the conflict was that it 
often occurred alongside other human rights violations (massacres, arbitrary 
detentions and torture), which resulted in a lack of attention paid to sexual 
violence. It also stated that sexual violence was often viewed as collateral damage 
of armed conflict, and not as a human rights violation).  
 47.  See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 263-
72. The CVR applied international law to support its gender-inclusive 
interpretation of its mandate. In particular, it relied on international and regional 
human rights instruments to define sexual violence as a form of torture, and on the 
jurisprudence of the international criminal ad hoc tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda to characterize sexual violence as a crime against 
humanity and as a war crime.  In its Final Report, the CVR included two sections 
on gender: the first analyzes how women and men experienced the conflict in a 
differentiated manner; the second deals specifically with different forms sexual 
violence against women, including rape, sexual slavery, forced cohabitation, 
forced pregnancies, and forced abortions. It also addressed cases of male sexual 
violence. See also Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42-45; see also Nesiah, supra 
note 16, at 4 (noting increased attention paid to gender in the CVR’s report but 
highlighting Peruvian feminists belief that the truth commission process was a lost 
opportunity for a more systematic and thorough engagement). 
 48.  BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 3; see CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. 
VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 277-78, 304-57 (describing in detail the sexual violence by 
state agents); see also Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42-45. Mantilla notes that 
the explanations state agents provided to the CVR regarding sexual violence give 
insights into their perception of the lack of gravity of these crimes. For example, 
members of the police who testified before the CVR stated that sexual violence 
was the consequence of “the irrationality of the males and the distance from their 
partners, as well as the solitude of the remote areas where they were posted.” Many 
did not view rape as a form of torture.  
 49.  See BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 4 (contrasting the Shining Path’s strict rules 
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CVR’s findings showed that racial and cultural discrimination of 
Andean and indigenous populations played a fundamental role in this 
violence.50 
In total, the CVR documented 538 cases of wartime rape, 
including 11 cases against males.51 While the CVR did not explicitly 
state that sexual violence by state agents had been systematic, it did 
indicate that acts of sexual violence might have reached the level of a 
systematic practice in some provinces of Ayacucho, Huancavelica 
and Apurímac in the context of the government’s counterinsurgency 
campaign.52 This finding is significant in establishing the liability of 
senior-level leaders for these acts. At the completion of its mandate, 
the CVR referred forty-seven cases to the Ministry of Public 
Prosecution for further assessment and investigation, three of which 
involved sexual violence against women: MMB (involving crimes of 
sexual violence as torture against a female detainee); military bases 
of Manta and Vilca (involving widespread sexual violence); and 
Chumbivilcas (involving massacres, enforced disappearances and 
sexual violence).53 These cases are examined in further detail in Part 
II. 
Despite the CVR’s findings, the Peruvian judiciary has 
persistently ignored sexual violence crimes perpetrated during the 
conflict. Key trials concerning grave violations have focused on 
other crimes, such as massacres and enforced disappearances.54 The 
against adultery, rape, prostitution, and homosexuality, with their involvement in 
these forbidden activities which led to forced marriages, forced pregnancies, 
infanticide, sexual torture and sexual slavery); see also CVR Final Report, supra 
note 11, at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 277-78, 280-300 (providing a detailed 
description of the different contexts and forms of sexual violence by subversive 
groups). The report also refers to cases of sexual violence by the MRTA. 
 50.  According to the CVR’s estimates, 80% of the over 69,000 dead and 
disappeared were young men of indigenous descent. Most of the women affected 
by the conflict lived in the departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurímac, 
three of the poorest areas in the country. Their profile was fairly similar to that of 
the men: low income, mostly Quechua speakers (73%), from rural areas (80%). 
See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.2; see also 
Salazar Luzula, supra note 45, at 57 (suggesting the sexual violence in Ayacucho, 
Huancavelica and Apurímac constituted a systematic practice); see also CVR Final 
Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.1, 47-48.   
 51.  CVR Final Report, supra note 11, at Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.2, 66. 
 52.  See id. at Vol. VI, Part IV, Ch. 1.1.5, 304.   
 53.  See Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42. 
 54.  See id. (noting that current cases in Peru are mainly focused on crimes by 
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CVR’s Final Report has become a crucial platform for the human 
rights movement in Peru. Relying on this report, civil parties have 
launched a number of other cases of sexual violence, and some are 
currently pending before the courts but proceeding slowly.55 
Although in 2004 the judiciary established specialized courts for 
cases of grave human rights abuses perpetrated in the conflict,56 in 
practice this reform has not sped up trials nor improved 
accountability for sexual violence.57 In several decisions,58 the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has addressed the persistent failure 
government security forces, as members of subversive groups have been 
prosecuted, albeit not for sexual violence crimes). 
 55.  See Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 42; see also discussion infra pp. 18-
21. 
 56.  See Defensoría del Pueblo, Resumen Ejecutivo: Informe Defensorial No 
162, A diez años de verdad, justicia y reparación. Avances, retrocesos y desafíos 
de un proceso inconcluso (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2013), 22-25, 
www.verdadyreconciliacionperu.com/admin/files/articulos/1771_digitalizacion.pdf 
(describing challenges and delays in trials concerning grave human rights abuses). 
 57.  See Gisela Astocondor Salazar et al., La judicialización de la violencia 
sexual en el conflicto armado en Perú: A propósito de los recientes estándares 
internacionales de derechos humanos desarrollados en la jurisprudencia de la 
Corte IDH, 53 REVISTA IIDH 213, 218 (2011). Between 2005 and 2013, the 
National Criminal Chamber issued 97 rulings concerning cases of grave human 
rights abuses, none of which included sexual violence charges. A report issued by 
the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012 
indicated only 16 cases of conflict-related sexual were under investigation, of 
which 13 were in the preliminary investigation phase by the Public Prosecution 
Office and 3 were before the judiciary. See also Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 
44; see also Defensoría del Pueblo, supra. 56, at 20-21; DIANE ALMÉRAS & CORAL 
CALDERÓN, SI NO SE CUENTA, NO CUENTA: INFORMACIÓN SOBRE LA VIOLENCIA 
CONTRA LAS MUJERES 44 (2012), http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/ 
11362/27859/ 1/S2012012_es.pdf. 
 58.  See, e.g., J v. Peru, IACtHR Series C No 275, Judgment (Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 27 November 2013), 126 ¶15 
(instructing the Peruvian State to “conduct an effective criminal investigation into 
the acts committed against Ms. J. that violated her personal integrity in order to 
establish criminal liability”); Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, 
Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs, 25 November 2006),Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 
(ser. C) No. 160,  at 166 ¶ 8 (Nov. 25, 2006) (calling on the Peruvian State to 
investigate the facts in the case, and identify those responsible and conduct 
criminal proceedings against them); Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru (Decision 
of 1 March 1996) Report No 5/ 96, case no 10.970, in Annual Report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 1995 OEA/ Ser.L/ V/ II.91, 182-8, at 
Section VII ¶3 (recommending that the Peruvian State conduct a thorough, rapid 
and impartial investigation into the sexual abuse of Raquel Mejía in order to 
identify and punish the perpetrators).   
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of the Peruvian State to properly tackle sexual violence and has 
called on the State to comply with its duty to investigate and 
prosecute these violations. This inaction and indifference sends 
victims an implicit message that their crimes are of secondary 
importance.59 
C. COLOMBIA 
The origins of Colombia’s 50-year conflict are complex, and its 
impact on the civilian population devastating. An armed struggle 
between government forces and different left-wing guerrilla groups 
began in the 1960s, arising from demands for social and land reforms 
The most significant groups to emerge were the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de 
Liberación Nacional, ELN). In the 1980s, as a backlash to the 
actions of guerrilla groups and the inaction of government forces, 
different right-wing paramilitary groups were formed in the areas of 
greatest guerrilla presence, eventually consolidating as the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Auto Defensas Unidas de 
Colombia, AUC) in the late 1990s. Violent competition for control of 
territory and resources (including drug-trafficking routes) ensued 
between guerrilla groups and paramilitaries, with paramilitaries at 
times acting jointly with government forces.60 Civilians have borne 
the brunt of this violence.61 
Sexual violence has been a prevalent and constant feature in the 
conflict. In its rulings, Colombia’s Constitutional Court has 
recognized the extensive and systematic nature of sexual violence in 
 59.  See BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 119 (arguing that impunity for cases of 
sexual violence is mainly shaped by the institutional sexism and racism that 
permeate the judiciary, as much as wider society in which these crimes were 
perpetrated). 
 60.  See Historical Memory Group 2013, supra note 12, at Ch. 2 (documenting 
the origins dynamics, and different periods of the conflict); Tribunal Superior de 
Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogota] [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz 
febrero 24, 2015, 110016000253200883612-00 (Colom.), ¶¶ 212, 313-14, 355-56 
[hereinafter Villa Zapata Judgment] (referring to different forms of criminal 
collaboration between government forces and paramilitaries in the region of 
Arauca). 
 61.  See Historical Memory Group 2013, supra note 12, at Ch. 1 (documenting 
the vast impact of the conflict on the civilian population, the patterns of violence 
and the perpetrator groups). 
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the conflict,62 and has stressed that sexual violence has taken on 
multiple forms and has been perpetrated by all armed actors.63 The 
Historical Memory Group (Grupo de Memoria Histórica)−a non-
judicial body established in 2005 to contribute to the reconstruction 
of the truth of the conflict−has documented the multiple forms and 
purposes of sexual violence perpetrated by the different armed 
actors.64 Different human rights organizations have also documented 
 62.  In a landmark ruling in 2008, the Constitutional Court stressed that sexual 
violence is “a habitual, extensive, systematic and invisible practice in the context 
of the Colombian armed conflict”. In a confidential annex to this decision, it 
referred 183 incidents of sexual violence to the Attorney General’s Office for 
investigation and prosecution. In a follow-up ruling in 2015, the Constitutional 
Court highlighted the ongoing prevalence of sexual violence, noting that all parties 
to the conflict were responsible for such crimes. It also referred 442 incidents of 
sexual violence to the Attorney General’s Office for follow-up. See Corte 
Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], Auto 092, abril 14, 2008, M.P: M. J. 
Cepeda Espinosa, Sala Segunda, Protección de los derechos fundamentales de las 
mujeres víctimas del desplazamiento forzado por causa del conflicto armado 
[hereinafter Auto 092/2008] (referring to the prevailing high rates of sexual 
violence by armed actors against displaced women); see also Corte Constitucional 
[C.C][Constitutional Court], Auto 009, enero 27, 2015, M.P.: L. E. Vargas Silva, 
6-13 [hereinafter Auto 009/2015] (highlighting the lack of progress by authorities 
in providing redress and justice to victims of sexual violence); Tribunal Superior 
de Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogotá] [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, 
diciembre 1, 2011, 1100160002532008-83194 (Colom.), ¶ 87 [hereinafter Peña 
Tobón Judgment] (acknowledging that sexual violence has been a constant feature 
in the Colombian conflict). 
 63.  See Auto 092/2008, supra note 62, at III.1.1.1-2. 
 64.  The Historical Memory Group was tasked under Law 975 of 2005 with 
producing a report on the origins and causes of the armed conflict in Colombia. 
While it has not fulfilled the role of a truth commission, it has conducted 
independent research on human rights abuses with a victim-oriented approach. It 
has also produced a number of reports addressing gender-based violence in the 
conflict. In 2013, this entity became the National Center for Historical Memory. 
See, e.g., Mujeres y Guerra. Víctimas y Resistentes en el Caribe Colombiano, 
CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA (2011), http://www.centrodememoria 
historica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/bastaYa/basta-ya-colombia-memorias-
de-guerra-y-dignidad-2016.pdf [hereinafter Historical Memory Group 2011] 
(documenting human rights abuses by paramilitary groups against women and girls 
in the Caribbean Coast); Crímenes Que No Prescriben: La Violencia Sexual del 
Bloque Vencedores de Arauca, CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORÍA HISTÓRICA, 59-
87, 107-60 (2015), http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/ 
informes2016/crimenes-que-no-prescriben/crimenes-que-no-prescriben.pdf 
(documenting gender-based violence against women by different armed actors in 
Arauca province, northern Colombia); see also Pilar Riaño Alcalá and María 
Victoria Uribe, Constructing Memory amidst War: The Historical Memory Group 
of Colombia, INT’L L. TRANSITIONAL JUST., 1, 9 (2016), 
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the large-scale commission of sexual violence65 and its organized 
nature.66 While documentation efforts have predominantly focused 
on female victims, there is now increased recognition of male sexual 
violence in the conflict.67  Different aspects of this violence have also 
http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/1/6. full.pdf+html (explaining the role of 
the Historical Memory Group and its investigative work with a focus on victims’ 
narratives). 
 65.  See, e.g., Olga Amparo Sanchez, et al., First Survey on the Prevalence of 
Sexual Violence against Women in the Context of the Colombian Armed Conflict, 
2001-2009, OXFAM, 7 (2011), http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/ 
NGO/vaw_violenceagainstwomenincolombiaarmedconflict_2011.pdf  (indicating 
that high prevalence of sexual violence between 2001-2009 in the municipalities 
with the presence of armed groups); see also This is what we Demand: Justice! 
Impunity for Sexual Violence Against Women in Colombia’s Armed conflict, 
AMNESTY INT’L, 23 (Sept. 2011), http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/ 
public/1109_rap_colombia.pdf [hereinafter This is What We Demand] 
(highlighting the entrenched impunity for conflict-related sexual violence by all 
armed actors in Colombia).   
 66.  See Colombia: Scarred Bodies, Hidden Crimes: Sexual Violence against 
Women in the Armed Conflict, AMNESTY INT’L, 3, 7, 11, 17 (October 13, 2004), 
https://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/2004_colombia.pdf (arguing that 
armed groups have perpetrated sexual violence to sow terror, obtain territorial 
control, inflict revenge on adversaries, and exploit victims, among other reasons); 
see also Guía para llevar casos de violencia sexual, CORPORACION HUMANAS, 23-
27 (2009), http://www.humanas.org.co/archivos/Guia_para_llevar_casos_de_ 
violencia_sexual.pdf (indicating that sexual violence has been perpetrated by 
armed groups within four contexts: during attacks on localities, to obtain territorial 
control, in detention, and within ranks); see also Historical Memory Group 2013, 
supra note 12, at 80-84 (describing different contexts in which sexual violence has 
been perpetrated by paramilitaries); see also Auto 092/2008, supra 62, at III.1.1.1-
2 (referring to different patterns of sexual violence by armed actors in the conflict); 
see also Auto 009/2015, supra note 62, at 15-27 (referring to the contextual risk 
factors that contribute to sexual violence by armed actors and the different 
scenarios in which these crimes are committed). 
 67.  See, e.g., Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogota] [Superior Tribunal 
of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz diciembre 16, 2014, 11001-22-52000-2014-
00058-0 (Colom.), ¶¶ 956, 988, 991 [hereinafter Triana Mahecha Judgment] 
(recognizing that men and boys can also be victims of sexual violence, and 
providing specific recommendations to the Attorney General’s Office on how to 
examine evidence of male sexual violence, and providing specific 
recommendations to the Attorney General’s Office on how to examine evidence of 
male sexual violence); see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶ 666 
(referring to the prevalence and lack of visibility of male sexual violence); see also 
Fiscalía General de la Nación, Resolución 01774, Protocolo de investigación de 
violencia sexual: Guía de buenas prácticas y lineamientos para la investigación 
penal y judicialización de delitos de violencia sexual, (June 14, 2016) ¶ 48-52  
[hereinafter 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol] (acknowledging that one of the myths 
about sexual violence is that men and boys cannot be victimized, and providing 
 
KRAVETZ- FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2017  12:40 PM 
2017] PROMOTING DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY  725 
emerged, such as the vulnerability to sexual violence of marginalized 
communities−in particular the Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
communities68− and the targeting of women and men because of 
their sexual orientation.69 
As in Guatemala and Peru, Colombian judicial authorities have 
routinely ignored these crimes, and impunity has been rife.70 In 
guidelines to investigators and prosecutors on how to address male sexual 
violence).  
 68.  See e.g., Historical Memory Group 2013, supra note 12, at 278-81; see 
also Sexual Violence in Colombia: Instrument of War, OXFAM, 3 (Sept. 9, 2009), 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-sexual-violence-
colombia.pdf (referring to the triple discrimination against women from Afro-
Colombian and indigenous communities because of their gender, ethnicity and 
their situation of poverty); see also Historical Memory Group 2011, supra note 64, 
at Chs. 2, 3 (documenting gender-based violence by paramilitaries against women 
in the Caribbean Coast region); see also U.N. Secretary General, Conflict-Related 
Sexual Violence: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/66/657–
S/2012/33 (Jan. 13, 2012) (referring to the disproportionate impact of sexual 
violence on Afro-Colombian and indigenous women and girls).  
 69.  Several recent decisions of the transitional justice system have highlighted 
the prevalence of violence against persons on the basis of their sexual orientation. 
See, e.g., Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, ¶¶ 220-21, 229, 1042 
(describing murders of men by paramilitaries on the basis of their sexual 
orientation, and recommending that the Attorney General Office treat violence on  
the basis of sexual orientation as a specific category of  violation); see also Triana 
Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, at 957 ¶ 55-6  (calling on the Attorney 
General’s Office to focus on examining possible patterns of violence against 
LGBT community based on their sexual orientation), see also Villa Zapata 
Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 657-66, 749-53 (referring to different forms of 
violence against the LGBT community by armed actors, and  reviewing domestic 
jurisprudence regarding crimes by paramilitary groups against persons on the basis 
of their sexual orientation); see also Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogota] 
[Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, noviembre 20, 2014, 11-001-
22-52-000-2014-00027 (Colom.), ¶¶ 1903-09 [hereinafter Mancuso Judgment] 
(finding that AUC members murdered a victim because of his sexual orientation as 
part of their “social cleansing” policy); see also Tribunal Superior de Medellin [T. 
Sup. Medellin] [Superior Tribunal of Medellin], Sala de Justicia y Paz, febrero 2, 
2015, 110016000253200680018 (Colom.), at 1331-1333 [hereinafter Vanoy 
Murillo Judgment]; see also Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 
septiembre 15, 2015, Sentencia T-025 DE 2004 (Colom.), ¶¶ 14-15 [hereinafter 
Sentencia T-025 DE 2004 (referring to violence by paramilitaries against members 
of the LGBT community); see also Auto 009/2015, supra 62, at 14-15 (referring to 
reports of violence by armed actors against women on the basis of their sexual 
orientation). 
 70.  See, e.g., Acceso a la Justicia para Mujeres Víctimas de Violencia Sexual, 
Sexto Informe de Seguimiento al Auto 092 y Primer Informe de Seguimiento al 
Auto 009 de la Corte Constitucional- Anexos Reservados, MESA DE SEGUIMIENTO, 
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January of 2015, Colombia’s Constitutional Court noted “with 
alarm” the persistence of sexual violence as a serious form of gender 
discrimination, and urged authorities to not only address these 
crimes, but to comply with their obligations to prevent and ensure 
their non-repetition.71 In the context of its ongoing preliminary 
examination in Colombia, the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) has repeatedly called on Colombia to comply 
with its international obligations to prosecute sexual violence.72 
Given the increased pressure to step up its efforts, the Attorney 
General’s Office has taken measures to prioritize the investigation of 
sexual violence.73 While investigations and prosecutions before the 
ordinary justice system have proceeded at a slow pace,74 some 
13-17 (March 2016) [hereinafter Working Group’s 2016 Report] (noting the 
almost total impunity in the over 600 sexual violence cases referred to the Attorney 
General’s Office by the Constitutional Court in its rulings Auto 092 of 2008 and 
Auto 009 of 2015); see also Colombia: Women, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 
and the Peace Process, ABCOLOMBIA, 1-2, 13-16 (November 2013) (reporting 
high levels of impunity for sexual violence and significant barriers for victims to 
access justice); see also Situation in Colombia: Interim Report, ICC: OFFICE OF 
THE PROSECUTOR, ¶ 19 (November 2012) [hereinafter Situation in Colombia: 
Interim Report] (noting the limited number of proceedings concerning “rape and 
other forms of sexual violence committed in the context of armed conflict, despite 
the scale of the phenomenon”).  
 71.  See Auto 009/2015, supra 62, at 7; see also Sentencia T-025/2004, supra 
69,  ¶ 7; see also Daniela Kravetz, Recent Developments in Colombian 
Jurisprudence for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, INTLAWGRRLS (Apr. 15, 
2015), https://ilg2.org/2015/04/15/recent-developments-in-colombian-
jurisprudence-on-conflict-related-sexual-violence/ (noting that the Constitutional 
Court has played a significant role in giving sexual violence crimes visibility).  
 72.  See Situation in Colombia: Interim Report, supra note 70, ¶ 19 (reporting 
that the Colombian Constitutional Court and United Nations Human Rights 
Committee have noted the “inadequacy of prosecutorial and judicial activity in 
relation to these crimes”); see also Statement by United Nations Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab 
Hawa Bangura: Breaking the Silence on Sexual Violence in Colombia (March 3, 
2015) [hereinafter Breaking the Silence on Sexual Violence in Colombia] 
(stressing that Colombian authorities must work to end the silence and impunity 
surrounding sexual violence crimes).  
 73.  See Working Group’s 2016 Report, supra note 70, at 76-79 (examining the 
prioritization strategy adopted by the Office of the Attorney General in 2015 
focused on the cases of conflict-related sexual violence); see also 2016 Sexual 
Violence Protocol, supra note 67 (aiming at providing prosecution and 
investigation staff with best practice guidelines in cases of sexual violence). 
 74.  See Working Group’s 2016 Report, supra note 70, at 14 (noting that from 
the 634 incidents of sexual violence referred to the Attorney General’s Office in 
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progress has been made under the transitional justice framework 
established by Law 975 of 2005 (known as the Justice and Peace 
Law) to prosecute demobilized paramilitaries.75 Several cases 
prosecuted under this framework have resulted in convictions for 
sexual and gender-based violence against former senior members of 
the AUC.76 These cases have highlighted the reasons why 
paramilitaries engaged in sexual violence, the various categories of 
victims, and its impact on local communities.77 
the Constitutional Court’s Orders 092 and 009, only 2,2% have resulted in 
convictions); see also Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, ICC: OFFICE 
OF THE PROSECUTOR, ¶ 154 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-
rep-2015-Eng.pdf (noting that “progress in the investigations and prosecutions of 
cases in the ordinary justice system over the reporting period is limited”).  
 75.  See L. 975/05, julio 25, 2005, 45.980 DIARO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) 
[hereinafter Justice and Peace Law]. 
 76.  The following cases prosecuted under the transitional justice framework of 
Law 975 have resulted in convictions for crimes of sexual and gender-based 
violence: Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60; Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra 
note 67; Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69; Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup. 
Bogota] [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, septiembre 1, 2014, 
11001-22-52000-2014-00019-00 (Colom.) [hereinafter Cifuentes Galindo 
Judgment]; Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup. Bogota] [Superior Tribunal of 
Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, mayo 29, 2014, 11-001-60-00253-2007 (Colom.) 
[hereinafter Isaza Arango Judgment]; Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [T. Sup. 
Bogota] [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, diciembre 7, 2011, 
110016000253-200681366 (Colom.) [hereinafter Fierro Flores Judgment]; Peña 
Tobón Judgment, supra note 62. In other cases, evidence of sexual and gender-
based violence has been considered to establish the contextual elements of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and the patterns of violence by paramilitary 
groups. See Tribunal Superior de Medellin [T. Sup. Medellin] [Superior Tribunal 
of Medellin], Sala de Justicia y Paz, abril 28, 2016, 110016000253200680068 
(Colom.) [hereinafter Arroyo Ojeda Judgment]; see also Vanoy Murillo Judgment, 
supra note 69, at ¶ 2510 (declaring gender-based violence as a pattern of 
macrocriminality of the Bloque Mineros of the AUC). All judgments are available 
here: http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/jyp/direccion-de-fiscalia-nacional-especializada-
de-justicia-transicional/ley_justicia_y_paz/ (last visited 15 July 2016). 
 77.  See Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 1290-96 (finding that the 
AUC used different forms of sexual and gender-based violence as a war tactic to 
gain control of territory, intimidate civilians, humiliate adversaries and destroy the 
social fabric of communities). In the Villa Zapata et al case, the tribunal examined 
the different forms of sexual and gender-based violence used by paramilitaries of 
the Bloque Vencedores de Arauca to spread terror among the population. In some 
instances, women who were suspected of having ties to left-wing guerilla groups 
were tortured and brutally gang-raped by paramilitaries, and some were murdered 
and dismembered after being raped. To explain why the victims had been targeted, 
the tribunal examined the context of violence and discrimination against women 
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In addition, the case against the notorious former paramilitary 
leader Marco Tulio Pérez Guzmán (“El Oso”) has set an important 
precedent in promoting accountability for sexual violence.78 This 
case focuses on crimes of sexual and gender-based violence against 
Afro-Colombian women and girls perpetrated by paramilitaries from 
2000 to 2004 in the Montes de María region, Colombia’s Caribbean 
coast.79 Under the transitional justice system, accused can benefit 
from a reduced sentence (five to eight years) provided they 
demobilize and fully disclose the truth about their crimes.80 While 
surrounding the crimes and concluded that the gender of the victims had influenced 
the types of harm inflicted on them. Through this violence, paramilitaries sought to 
both punish the women and humiliate the men of the opposing side.  Villa Zapata 
Judgment, supra note 60, at ¶¶ 881-904, 907-10, 913, 919-20, 924-28; see also 
Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, at ¶¶ 940-41; see also Vanoy Murillo 
Judgment, supra note 69, at 1274-1331 (examining different forms of sexual and 
gender-based violence perpetrated by the Bloque Mineros of the AUC against 
women and girls); see also Vanoy Murillo Judgment, supra note 69, at 1300-1301 
(referring to the murder of female community leaders because of their perceived 
association with guerrilla groups); see also Vanoy Murillo Judgment, supra note 
69, at 1306-1037 (indicating that local families provided their virgin daughters to 
paramilitary commanders to show their loyalty and in exchange for protection). 
 78.  See Marcelle Cohen, Sexual Violence: The Invisible, Mute, and Exempt 
Crime Against Humanity, ROBERT S. STRAUSS CTR. (Aug. 4, 2015), 
https://www.strausscenter.org/strauss-articles/sexual-violence-the-invisible-mute-
and-exempt-crime-against-humanity.html (highlighting that Pérez Guzmán’s 
inability to admit his sexual abuse of women, despite admitting to systemic 
murders and other crimes, resulted in the first time an ex-paramilitary leader lost 
the benefits of the Justice and Peace Law for failing to acknowledge crimes of 
sexual violence). 
 79.  Pérez Guzmán (El Oso) is accused of regularly abducting women and girls 
from a village under his group’s control and holding them for prolonged periods at 
his military base, where he subjected them to repeated rapes, mistreatment and 
forced labor. These crimes formed part of a broader context of violence by 
paramilitaries against civilians in the region. Paramilitaries used different forms of 
violence to obtain territorial control−including killings, abductions and torture−and 
imposed exemplifying punishments based of the gender of the victims. In 
particular, they used sexual violence as a means to punish women who “failed to 
respect” the social rules they imposed. This violence became an expression of their 
power over the women in the region. See Historical Memory Group 2011 Report, 
supra note 64, at 158-69. 
 80.  Law 905 of 2005 was adopted to facilitate the reintegration of members of 
armed groups into civilian life, and contains provisions regarding the investigation, 
prosecution and sentencing of members of armed groups who decide to 
demobilize. The Constitutional Court issued several ruling interpreting the law. Its 
ruling C-370 of 2006 is particularly significant as it held that the Law did not 
design an effective incentive system for promoting full and accurate confessions 
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initially tried under this system, Pérez Guzmán lost the benefits of 
Law 975 for failing to tell the truth about the rapes he was charged 
with, and his case was referred to an ordinary court for trial.81  He 
now faces up to 20 years in prison if found guilty. 
On August 24, 2016, the government and the FARC signed a 
peace agreement in Havana, Cuba, putting an end to the longest 
running civil war.82 The parties have agreed that there will be no 
amnesty for serious international crimes, including for sexual 
violence. However, the peace negotiations revealed complex tensions 
between holding actors accountable for past war crimes and 
advancing the peace process. For this peace to last, the parties need 
to promote accountability of those most responsible for serious 
international crimes−from both the FARC and the state− and need to 
ensure that the full range of crimes are addressed, including crimes  
of sexual violence. At the time of writing, the government and the 
ELN have initiated peace discussions. 
III. ADJUDICATING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND ESTABLISHING 
LIABILITY 
Despite the prevailing impunity for sexual violence, efforts are 
being made in each of the case study countries to prosecute these 
crimes. In seeking accountability, legal practitioners have been 
confronted with how to use their domestic legal framework to 
by the accused, and required that to be eligible for benefits, demobilized fighters 
had to provide complete and accurate confessions. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] 
[Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 2006, Sentencia C-370/06 (Colom.); see 
generally Latin America Report N°49: Transitional Justice and Colombia’s Peace 
Talks, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-
america-caribbean/andes/colombia/transitional-justice-and-colombia-s-peace-talks 
(analyzing the implementation of Law 975 since its adoption).  
 81.  See Recent Developments in Colombian Jurisprudence for Conflict-
Related Sexual Violence, supra note 71 (citing the Barranquilla Tribunal ruling that 
Pérez Guzmán would not benefit from the Justice and Peace Law because “the 
accused must fully disclose the truth about their crimes”). 
 82.  See generally Excerpts from the August 24 Announcement of a Final Peace 
Accord between the Government and the FARC, WOLA (Aug. 25, 2016), 
http://colombiapeace.org; see also Nicholas Casey, Colombia and FARC Reach 
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accurately characterize sexual violence as an international crime. 
This has been a complex exercise. It has required finding a coherent 
balance between advocating for progressive interpretations of 
domestic criminal provisions without sidestepping the principle of 
legality. It has also required understanding how international law can 
be used to support charges of sexual violence and to reflect the 
varied manifestations of sexual violence in conflict. The adjudication 
of sexual violence as an international crime in the cases discussed 
below has served to reflect the gravity of the criminal conduct and to 
acknowledge the harm caused to the victims. These cases have also 
challenged the misconception that sexual violence is an incidental 
by-product of armed conflict and of less gravity than other 
violations. 
Establishing liability for sexual violence has also posed significant 
challenges and obstacles. While the tendency in the case study 
countries has been to pursue physical perpetrators, progress has been 
made in recent years in holding senior officials accountable for 
sexual violence. In cases against senior-level leaders who were not 
physical perpetrators or present at the scene of the crimes, 
practitioners have had to focus on linking the crimes to the accused. 
This has required choosing the appropriate mode of liability and 
obtaining evidence to connect the conduct of the accused to the 
sexual violence. These cases have demonstrated the connections 
between sexual violence and the objectives of criminal campaigns 
unleashed by armed groups, and have highlighted the role sexual 
violence played in these campaigns. These cases have also helped 
overcome the misconception that only physical perpetrators can be 
held accountable for sexual violence. 
A. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO INTERPRET AND APPLY 
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS IN GUATEMALA 
In Guatemala, the Criminal Code contains a provision to prosecute 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, Article 378, entitled 
“Crimes against the Duties of Humanity”.83 This article is an open 
 83.  CÓDIGO PENAL (Criminal Code) art. 378 (Guat.) [hereinafter Guatemalan 
Crim. Code] (“Crimes against the Duties of Humanity: Whosoever violates or 
infringes humanitarian obligations, laws or covenants regarding prisoners or 
hostages of war or those wounded in battle, or whosoever commits any inhuman 
act against the civilian population or against hospitals or places designated for the 
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provision in that it does not describe in detail the conduct proscribed, 
but makes reference to sources of international law. This provision 
has been interpreted as allowing courts to adjudicate acts constituting 
war crimes or crimes against humanity under customary or 
conventional international law binding on Guatemala.84 
In the aforementioned Sepur Zarco case, Article 378 was used to 
bring charges of sexual violence. During the pre-trial phase, the 
prosecution and the civil parties relied on Article 378 to argue that 
conduct amounting to rape, sexual and domestic enslavement, and 
cruel and degrading treatment was recognized as crimes against 
humanity under customary international law when the crimes were 
committed, and that this provision allows a court to define the 
proscribed conduct by reference to international law binding on 
Guatemala. During the stage of proceedings intended to determine 
whether there is a basis for committing a person to trial, the First 
Instance Judge permitted the case to go to trial on the basis of these 
specific charges. He reasoned, in part, that Article 378 is a “blank 
penal law,”85 and that while it does not describe the conduct in detail, 
there was nothing barring its application to these crimes.86 
In its decision issued on February 26, 2016, the High Risk 
Tribunal “A” convicted both accused−Reyes Girón and Valdez 
Asig−for the crimes charged under Article 378. The Tribunal found 
that in 1982, the army attacked the community of Sepur Zarco, 
killing or forcibly disappearing a group of male Mayan Q’eqchi’ 
leaders who had taken steps to obtain recognition of their land 
rights.87 Other men were detained and severely mistreated.88 The 
wounded[,] will be sentenced from 20-30 years in prison.”). 
 84.  See Monitoreo de la Justicia Transicional en Guatemala, Tomo II: 
Derecho a la justicia para las víctimas del Conflicto Armado Interno, IMPUNITY 
WATCH, 16-18, 20-21, 63 (2014), http://www.impunitywatch.org/docs/Research_ 
report_informe_monitoreo_IW_JUSTICIA_Dec_2014.pdf.  
 85.  Juzgado Primero de Primera Instancia Penal Oct. 14, 2014, Narcoactividad 
y Delitos contra el Ambiente por Procesos de Mayor Riesgo [First Tribunal for 
Crime, Drug Trafficking and Environmental Offences] Oct. 14, 2014, Expediente 
No. C-01076-2012-00021, Resolución de Fase Intermedia (Guat.). 
 86.  See Rios Montt Judgment, supra note 27, at 707 (showing a consistent 
interpretation of the law). At the time of writing, legislative reform is underway in 
Guatemala to implement the Rome Statute domestically.  
 87.  See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at  126, 128-30,198-200, 209-
11, 214-15, 218-19, 223, 235, 239-40, 260-61, 264, 267-68, 273, 292, 474 
(describing, among other things, that local landowners felt threatened by these 
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women in the community suffered a different fate. The army burned 
down their homes and their belongings.89 They also raped the women 
during the attack against the community.90 One woman was 
repeatedly raped in front of her two young daughters, and was 
subsequently killed along with her daughters.91 In the absence of 
their husbands, the soldiers considered the women to be at their 
disposal, and they forced the women to take turns washing, cooking 
and cleaning for them at the Sepur Zarco military base, giving them 
no financial compensation.92 They also subjected the women to 
repeated sexual violence at the base.93 The women were also raped in 
their homes, sometimes in front of their children, and by the river 
when they went to wash clothes.94 Several families sought refuge in 
the mountains, and suffered from malnutrition and starvation.95 
These abuses continued for six years, until the soldiers withdrew 
from Sepur Zarco.96 As a result of this violence, the women suffered 
demands and had called upon the army to suppress them).  
 88.  See id. at 345-54. 
 89.  See id. at 219-20, 225, 230, 233, 235, 239-40, 255-56.   
 90.  See id. at 485; see also Elisabeth Patterson, The Sepur Zarco Trial from an 
Indigenous Law Perspective, AVOCAT SANS FRONTIERS (Apr. 27, 2016), 
http://www.asfcanada.ca/fr/blogue/billet/the-sepur-zarco-trial-from-an-indigenous-
law-perspective/317 (describing how the victims expressed themselves in 
Q’eqchi’, and how the issue of translation was particularly important during trial 
because the victims often used euphemisms to speak about the rapes, such as the 
term “Barz’unleek” which, taken literally, translates as “they played with me,” but 
in fact means “they raped me”).  
 91.  Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at  200-01, 205, 283-86, 352, 482-
83. 
 92.  See id. at  200, 206, 259, 279. 
 93.  See id., at  205, 211, 216, 220-21, 240, 259, 479 (recounting several 
women’s encounters when they went to the base to cook every three days and, 
each time, different soldiers raped them and other women at gunpoint).  
 94.  See id. at 200, 207, 209, 220-21, 224, 230, 235, 255, 265-66, 269, 271, 
273, 478; see also Jo-Marie Burt, Victim Witnesses Tell of Atrocites at Sepur 
Zarco, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.ijmonitor.org/ 
2016/02/victim-witnesses-tell-of-atrocities-at-sepur-zarco/ (describing one 
woman’s experience that soldiers would often pass by her house and rape her, 
saying that “‘[t]he [soldiers] told me if I didn’t let them [rape me] they would kill 
me,’ she said. ‘Sometimes they tied me down and put a rifle on my chest. . . . They 
knew which ones of us [women] were alone. . . . They treated us like animals, . . . 
It was so painful. They did this to me because I was alone’”); see also Sepur Zarco 
Judgment, supra note 36, at  211-13. 
 95.  See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at  270-73, 275, 480. 
 96.  See id. at  206, 256-57. 
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serious physical and psychological harm.97 They also suffered 
cultural harm, seeing their lives within the community destroyed.98 
The Tribunal held that the Guatemalan army perpetrated these crimes 
against Mayan Q’eqchi’ women as a means of exercising control and 
power over the community.99 It also acknowledged the victims’ 
courage in testifying publicly about their experiences and in breaking 
the silence about these crimes.100 
Two evidentiary issues in relation to this case are worth 
highlighting. First, to minimize the trauma for the victims, the 
tribunal allowed the prosecution and the civil parties to introduce the 
testimonies of the victims at trial using pre-recorded videos in lieu of 
oral testimony (called anticipatory evidence under Guatemalan law), 
and it found this evidence to be reliable and internally consistent.101 
One of the victims died before the start of the trial, and the tribunal 
admitted her pre-recorded testimony, finding it reliable.102 Second, 
the parties adduced a range of other sources of evidence to prove the 
charges, including testimonial, forensic and documentary 
evidence.103 In particular, the prosecution and the civil parties called 
 97.  See id. at 200, 207, 256, 273 (describing the psychological repercussions 
of violence against women). 
 98.  See id. at 476-77; see also Patterson, supra note 90 (noting that the victims 
have been unable to remarry or recover their plot of land, and have “often had to 
live with their mother, beg to survive, or work for other members of the 
community as servants”). 
 99.  See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at  473. 
 100.  See id. at 489 (“it is necessary to emphasize that we, the judges, have 
observed that the women victims broke down during their testimonies, expressing 
their pain, suffering, solitude and helplessness, not only because of what occurred 
to them at that time, but also because of their powerlessness before armed men 
who changed the course of their lives, without caring about the consequences of 
their actions”) (unofficial translation). 
 101.  See Victim Witnesses Tell of Atrocities at Sepur Zarco, supra note 94 
(explaining that the testimonies were videotaped at preliminary evidentiary 
hearings in 2012, at which time the accused were represented by public defenders, 
and the videotaped testimonies were accepted as evidence in this manner due to the 
advanced age of the victims and in an attempt to prevent their re-traumatization); 
see also Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at  263, 272, 275, 471, 485. 
 102.  See Victim Witnesses Tell of Atrocities at Sepur Zarco, supra note 94; see 
also Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at  260-64. 
 103.  See Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, at 420-23, 433-72 (including 
evidence of military plans designed by the Guatemalan army that formed the 
framework of its counterinsurgency campaign and set out the measures of control 
to be implemented vis-à-vis the Mayan population); see also Sepur Zarco 
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more than a dozen expert witnesses.104 Among other issues, the court 
relied on this expert testimony in relation to: the elements of the 
crimes charged under international law; the assessment of the 
credibility of victims of gross human rights abuses; the broader 
context of violence in which the crimes of sexual violence occurred; 
the impact of the crimes on the victims and their community; and the 
military and political structures in place during the relevant period.105 
These expert witnesses provided the judges with the contextual 
evidence necessary to find that the crimes charged fell within the 
scope of Article 378. 
B. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ADDRESS PAST CRIMES IN PERU 
As in Guatemala, Peruvian criminal law does not explicitly 
recognize sexual violence as an international crime. Two different 
criminal codes are applied in Peru in cases of serious human rights 
abuses, the 1924 and the 1991 Codes. Their application depends on 
the period of commission of the crimes. While different forms of 
sexual violence are listed as ordinary crimes in both, neither code 
recognizes these crimes as international crimes. The 1991 Code 
contains crimes against humanity provisions regarding other 
categories of crimes of non-sexual nature.106 The lack of a proper 
legal framework makes it more difficult to address past crimes of 
sexual violence; if charged as ordinary crimes, these crimes can be 
subject to the statute of limitations.107 In addition, charging conflict-
related sexual violence as an ordinary crime fails to take into account 
the broader context of violence in which it occurred. 
Given the absence of clear provisions, practitioners have been 
Judgment, supra note 36, at 405-06. 
 104.  See id., at  417-18. The approach of leading extensive expert evidence was 
also followed in the Ríos Montt case. 
 105.  See id. at 473-77.  
 106.  See Peru 1991 Crim. Code. arts. 319-24 (recognizing the following crimes 
as crimes against humanity: genocide, torture, enforced disappearance, 
discrimination and genetic manipulation); compare 1924 Peru Crim. Code art. 194 
(containing more restrictive provisions to prosecute sexual violence, such as the 
limiting the definition of the crime of rape to be gender-specific, requiring the 
victim to be female) with Peru 1991 Crim. Code art. 170 (providing a gender-
neutral definition of rape as to the perpetrator and the victim). This difference can 
have implications as to the crimes charged under each code. 
 107.  See Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 44. 
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confronted with how to charge past crimes as international crimes 
without violating the principle of legality.108 They have tried to 
overcome this hurdle by arguing for an “adapted” principle of 
legality grounded on the Peruvian Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation of the primacy of international human rights treaties 
over domestic law.109 Concretely, practitioners have argued that 
crimes of sexual violence can be prosecuted as international crimes 
before Peruvian courts provided that the charges are grounded in 
international law binding on Peru and that the required contextual 
elements for international crimes are met. In practice, prosecutors 
charge the criminal conduct under domestic criminal provisions−for 
example as rape−while characterizing the act as a crime against 
 108.  The issue of the legal characterization of human rights violations as crimes 
against humanity was raised in relation to the massacres committed by a 
paramilitary death squad known as the Colina group in Lima’s Barrios Altos 
district and at La Cantuta University in the early 1990s. The jurisprudence in 
relation to these events has been relied upon in subsequent cases where crimes 
have been charged as crimes against humanity. In 2009, the Special Criminal 
Chamber of the Supreme Court sentenced former President Alberto Fujimori to 25 
years for these massacres. It held that while these crimes were characterized as 
aggravated murder and grievous bodily harm under domestic law, they amounted 
to crimes against humanity under international customary law. See Sala Penal 
Especial de la Corte Suprema [S.P.E.C.S.] [Special Criminal Chamber of the 
Supreme Court], abril 7, 2009, “Fujimori, Alberto c. Borja, Luis Antonio León,” 
Rol de la causa: AV 19-2001, ¶¶ 711, 714, 717 (Peru) [hereinafter Fujimori 
Judgment]. However, in 2012, in a related case against Vladimiro Montesinos, the 
former head of national intelligence, and other members of the Colina group, the 
Permanent Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court held that the Barrios Altos and 
La Cantuta massacres did not amount to crimes against humanity, among other 
reasons, because the actions of the Colina group targeted terrorists and not 
civilians. Human rights advocates brought the case before the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, which found that the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision 
departed from prior jurisprudence that had characterized these crimes as crimes 
against humanity. It also found that the 2012 Supreme Court’s decision violated 
the rights of the victims and their families to truth, justice and reparation. The 
Supreme Court eventually overturned its 2012 ruling, finding that these crimes 
amounted to crimes against humanity. See Barrios Altos v. Peru, Monitoring 
Compliance with Judgment, Judgment, ¶¶ 32-48, 58-63 (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/barrios_07_09_12.pdf. 
 109.  Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 25, 2006, 
“Colegio de Abogados de Arequipa c. el artículo 22, inciso c), de la Ley N.º 
26397, Orgánica del Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura,” Rol de la causa: 0025-
2005- PI/TC y 0026-2005- PI/TC, constitucional, ¶¶ 25-34 (Peru) (holding that 
international human rights treaties binding on Peru form part of the internal legal 
framework). 
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humanity by arguing that the contextual elements are met. An 
alternative approach has been to charge sexual violence as torture, 
which has been recognized as a crime against humanity under 
domestic law since 1998.110 This legal characterization of sexual 
violence as an international crime results in the inapplicability of the 
statute of limitations.111 
In an emblematic case concerning the Manta and Vilca military 
bases, crimes of sexual violence are being pursued as crimes against 
humanity.112 This case involves two military bases established in 
neighboring communities in the rural highland province of 
Huencavelica between 1984 and 1995.113 Members of the army at 
 110.  Legal practitioners have taken different approaches to characterizing 
sexual violence as torture. For example, in one ruling from 2007, the 
Supraprovincial Criminal Prosecution Office of Huencavelica, characterized acts 
of sexual violence as torture and declared the non-applicability of the statute of 
limitations. See  Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 44. However, in another case 
dealing with abuses at the Manta and Vilca military bases between 1984 and 1988, 
a provincial judge held that the rapes could not be characterized as torture, contrary 
to what the prosecution and the civil parties had argued. While recognizing that the 
statute of limitations does not apply to serious violations of human rights, the judge 
found that the crime of torture could not be charged in this case because it had only 
been incorporated into the Criminal Code in 1998, after the facts in the case took 
place. The judge retained the charges of rape as ordinary crimes and characterized 
them as crimes against humanity, relying on international law. See Segundo 
Tribunal Supraprovincial Penal [S.T.S.P.] [Second Supraprovincial Criminal 
Tribunal], noviembre 9, 2009, “Sabino Valentin Rutti,” Rol de la causa: 2010-
00312- 10, Auto de apertura de instrucción, 8-10, 15-17 (Peru).  
 111.  See Fujimori Judgment, supra note 108, at ¶¶ 711-16 (holding that under 
international customary law, crimes that occur in the context of a widespread or 
systematic attack against the civilian population are not subject to a statute of 
limitations); see also Barrios Altos v. Peru, Monitoring Compliance with 
Judgment, Judgment, ¶ 41 (Aug. 4, 2008), http://corteidh.or.cr/ 
docs/supervisiones/barrios_04_08_08_ing.pdf (holding that all amnesty provisions, 
provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate 
responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the 
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights 
violations). 
 112.  René Zubieta Pacco, Violaciones en Manta y Vilca: juicio a militares 
inicia mañana, El Comercio (July 7, 2016), http://elcomercio.pe/sociedad/ 
huancavelica/violaciones-manta-y-vilca-juicio-militares-inicia-manana-noticia-
1915125. Cf. BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 118 (noting the numerous delays in the 
prosecutor’s investigation into these events).   
 113.  BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 117. At the time of the events, the districts of 
Manta and Vilca were small, rural communities with no running water, sewage, or 
electricity. See generally Mercedes Crisóstomo Meza, Mujeres y Fuerzas Armadas 
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these bases are accused of systematic crimes of sexual violence 
against the population, as well as of other gross human rights 
abuses.114 Many women were raped by soldiers in the bases, in their 
houses, and even in public spaces.115 In its Final Report, the CVR 
identified twenty-four victims of sexual violence, and concluded that, 
“sexual violence was a persistent and daily practice in the region of 
Manta and Vilca, perpetrated primarily by the army from military 
bases in the area”.116 Prosecutors and the civil parties have argued 
that these crimes amount to crimes against humanity because they 
were committed in the context of widespread and systematic human 
rights abuses against the Manta and Vilca communities.117 Despite 
numerous delays, the trial against members of the Peruvian military 
for these crimes began in July 2016.118 A conviction regarding these 
events would mark an important precedent in recognizing sexual 
violence as a crime against humanity in Peru. 
en un Contexto de Violencia Política: Los Casos de Manta y Vilca en 
Huancavelica 6-43 (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Working Paper No. 210, 2015). 
 114.  Cuarto Juzgado Penal Supraprovicinal de Lima [Fourth Supraprovincial 
Criminal Tribunal of Lima], 2009, Auto apertorio de instrucción del caso de las 
mujeres violadas en las comunidades de Manta y Vilca, ¶ 11. 
 115.  See BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 117 (describing the perpetrators crimes).   
 116.  CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.1, 86 
(characterizing these acts as both rape and torture and noting that sexual violence 
constituted a pattern of action by military personnel in the area, who took 
advantage of their power to commit these crimes).  Many of the victims were 
suspected of being senderistas, and in some cases the soldiers raped them to 
extract information from them, or to intimidate them; CVR Final Report, supra 
note 11, Vol. VIII, Part II, Ch. 2.1, 65, 86. 
 117.  See Carlos Rivera Paz, Fiscalía presentó acusación en caso Manta y Vilca 
(March 12, 2015), http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/notihome/notihome 
01.php?noti=1572 (describing the challenges faced in investigating this case); see 
also CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VIII, Part. II, Ch. 2.1, 99 
(documenting the context in which the rapes took place within the broader context 
of sexual violence against women during the conflict). 
 118.  Fernando Alayo Orbegozo, Manta y Vilca: Fiscalía pide que jucio sea por 
lesa humanidad, El Comercio (July 9, 2016), http://elcomercio.pe/ 
sociedad/peru/manta-y-vilca-fiscalia-pide-que-juicio-sea-lesa-humanidad-noticia-
1915594; Cristina Valega Chipoco & Julio Rodriguez Vasquez, Violaciones 
sexuales en Manta de 20 años de impunidad?, ENFOQUE DERECHO (June 16, 
2016), http://enfoquederecho.com/penal/violaciones-sexuales-en-manta-y-vilca-el-
fin-de-mas-de-20-anos-de-impunidad/; see BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 117-18 
(noting some major reasons why the prosecution fails to bring charges in so many 
instances of sexual violence); see generally Mantilla Falcón, supra note 44, at 45 
(providing procedural background of the case).  
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Two further emblematic cases could also set important precedents: 
the Chumbivilcas and the Los Cabitos cases. In both cases, 
prosecutors and the civil parties have argued that the crimes amount 
to crimes against humanity, and both are currently in the trial phase. 
The Chumbivilcas case concerns crimes perpetrated by a military 
patrol that went into various communities in the province of 
Chumbivilcas, Cuzco department, searching for “subversive 
elements” during a ten-day period in April 1990.119 During this 
period, members of the military patrol perpetrated widespread abuses 
against civilians, including extrajudicial killings, torture and 
enforced disappearances.120 The soldiers also raped some of the 
women in these communities.121 The prosecution has argued that the 
pattern of human rights abuses perpetrated by the military, the 
number of victims, and the tactics employed in the context of its 
counterinsurgency campaign amount to a widespread and systematic 
attack on the civilian population, and that the crimes should therefore 
be characterized as crimes against humanity.122 
The crimes in the Los Cabitos case were perpetrated in Andean 
Peru at the military base Los Cabitos, located in Huamanga, 
Ayacucho Deparment.123 The base functioned as a detention and 
torture center for those suspected of belonging to subversive groups, 
as well as a site for extrajudicial killings.124 The accused in the case 
include former senior members of the Peruvian military.125 In 2003, 
the CVR documented 138 cases of torture, enforced disappearance 
and killings between 1983 and 1985 at Los Cabitos, but further 
 119.  See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VII, Ch. 2.42. 
 120.  See id. 
 121.  See id. 
 122.  Segunda Fiscalía Superior Penal Nacional [Second Superior National 
Public Prosecution], Jaime Manuel Pando Navarrete y otros por delitos contra la 
humanidad en la modalidad Desaparición Forzada y otros, Exp. No. 037-2008, 
Dictamen N. 07-2014-2°FSPN-MP/FN, March 5, 2013, 7-8. 
 123.  See BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 109-10 (detailing the gross atrocities that 
occurred at the military base).   
 124.  See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VII, Ch. 2.9. 
 125.  This case was initially investigated in the 90s, but later shelved. A report 
from the Inter-American Commission regarding this case prompted authorities to 
reopen the investigation in 1996, only to later close it. A probe into these events 
was finally re-launched after the publication of the CVR’s Final Report in 2003. 
See CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VII, Ch. 2.9; see also IACHR Report, 
supra note 119 (discussing the petitioner’s position on the issues). 
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victims have been identified since.126 Human rights organizations 
have brought forward evidence of sexual violence against women at 
the base.127 The trial in this case is currently underway, although 
proceeding slowly.128 
While these developments are promising, the Peruvian judiciary 
has yet to adjudicate sexual violence as a crime against humanity. A 
challenge prosecutors are facing is to convince judges that sexual 
violence formed part of the broader context of human rights abuses 
perpetrated against the civilian population during the conflict. For 
example, in the 2015 Vallejo Cortéz case, the accused was acquitted 
of the sexual violence charge because the judges failed to properly 
apply the contextual elements for crimes against humanity. Vallejo 
Cortéz, then a military captain, was charged with committing the 
crimes of murder, attempted murder, torture and rape as crimes 
against humanity against villagers in the province of Vilcashuamán, 
Ayacucho, in May 1989.129 Among other crimes, he was accused of 
raping a female villager in her home while he searched for 
subversive material.130 During his trial, Vallejo Cortéz pled guilty to 
 126.  CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VII, Ch. 2.9; BOESTEN, supra note 
4, at 109-10 (noting that forensic scientists have identified the bones of 109 people, 
though some people estimate around 300 people were killed). 
 127.  The sexual violence evidence has been heard in support of the overall 
pattern of crimes against humanity. E.g., Gloria Cano et al., Cuartel Los Cabitos: 
Lugar de Horror y Muerte (D & L Publicaciones E.I.R.L. 2014) (expanding on the 
details of the case); see Caso Cabitos, Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos, 
http://www.aprodeh.org.pe/index.php/casos-judicializados/ayacucho/86-prueba-de-
articulo-en-caso-ayacucho (last updated Oct. 5, 2016) (providing a case summary). 
 128.  Several of the accused, as well as several family members of the victims, 
have died during the course of the trial proceedings. See, e.g., Marie Castillo, Solo 
quedan 5 procesados en el caso Los Cabitos, LA REPUBLICA (June 29, 2015), 
http://larepublica.pe/impresa/politica/11409-solo-quedan-5-procesados-en-el-caso-
los-cabitos; see Jo-Marie Burt & María Rodríguez, Juicio por el Caso Los Cabitos. 
Crónicas de las audiencias en Ayacucho (Partes 1 & 2), ASUNTOS DEL SUR BLOG 
(Aug. 27-28, 2012), http://asuntos.sudwebs.com/blog/tag/jo-marie-burt/ (giving 
details about the trial). 
 129.  See Sala Penal Nacional [National Criminal Chamber], Cesar Augusto 
Vallejo Cortez, Penal No. 49-2013, Sentencia, enero 27, 2015 [hereinafter Vallejo 
Cortez Judgment]. 
 130.  According to the prosecution, Vallejo Cortéz, together with several 
subordinates, had been drinking at a local establishment in the village, outside their 
military base. After some hours, Vallejo Cortéz entered the private home of the 
owner of the establishment, claiming to search the home for material supporting 
subversive groups, and raped her. To cover up his crime, he accused her of being a 
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all charges. In its 25-page sentencing judgment, the judges found the 
accused guilty of all charges, except the rape.131 While finding that 
the crimes occurred in the context of serious human rights abuses by 
the military against the civilian population, the judges found that the 
rape−unlike the other crimes−was an isolated incident and was not 
perpetrated pursuant to “systematic orders” from the military, nor in 
the context of a coordinated military operation.132 The judges 
concluded that the rape amounted to an ordinary crime and that 
therefore the statute of limitations for such crimes applied.133 An 
appeal in this case is pending. 
Finally, the Peruvian judiciary has not yet addressed other forms 
of state-sponsored gender-based violence. One example is the mass 
forced sterilizations program implemented during the Fujimori 
regime in the 1990s, in which over 200,000 women and 20,000 
men−mostly from poor and indigenous backgrounds−were sterilized 
without their informed consent.134 Over the years, women’s rights 
senderista, and burned down her store. He also ordered his soldiers to open fire on 
some villagers celebrating a birthday in a neighboring house, also accusing them of 
being senderistas. Several villagers were killed and others injured in this incident. 
Vallejo Cortéz later reported to his superiors that the Shining Path had perpetrated 
these crimes. According to the prosecution, to further cover up the crimes, the 
military later arrested several relatives of the deceased and tortured them, forcing 
them to sign statements that members of the Shining Path were responsible for the 
crimes. They also arrested the rape victim and took her to their military base, 
where they raped her in a bid to silence her. See id. at 4-7. 
 131.  See id. at 18 (noting the accused was also acquitted of the charge of abuse 
of authority). 
 132.  Id. at 19. The reasoning followed by the judges in dismissing the sexual 
violence charge in this case is not consistent with international criminal law. To 
amount to a crime against humanity, it is not the sexual violence per se that must 
be shown to be widespread or systematic, but rather the attack of which the sexual 
violence formed part. See Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, 
Appeals Judgment by Judges Shahabuddeen, Guney, Daqun, Meron and 
Schomburg, ¶ 102 (July 7, 2006); see Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-
23 & 23/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 96 (June 12, 2002). 
 133.  See Vallejo Cortez Judgment, supra 130, at 23. 
 134.  See ALEJANDRA BALLÓN, MEMORIAS DEL CASO PERUANO DE 
ESTERLIZACIÓN FORZADA 32-34 (Alejandra Ballón ed. 2014), 
http://bvirtual.bnp.gob.pe/bnp/faces/pdf/esterilizacionforzada/index.html#34 
(arguing that the implementation of the state run sterilization program had a 
distinct gendered impact because it targeted a significantly higher percentage of 
females); see also Javier Lizarzaburu, Forced sterilization haunts Peruvian women 
decades on, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world 
latinamerica34855804 (detailing the timeline of events that led to the investigation 
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groups have repeatedly called for these crimes to be investigated and 
prosecuted as crimes against humanity and as genocide, and for 
Fujimori and his former health ministers to be held accountable for 
these crimes. In 2014, the Public Prosecution Office closed a pending 
investigation into these crimes, allegedly due to lack of evidence. 
The civil parties later filed a complaint against this decision, forcing 
the Public Prosecution to reopen its investigation.135 However, in late 
July 2016, the public prosecutor in charge of the case ruled that 
Fujimori and his former health ministers would not face charges for 
their state-run sterilization program, closing the case. The prosecutor 
indicated that individual medical personnel was responsible for the 
“isolated” cases of sterilization and recommended that several 
doctors be charged.136 The civil parties have filed an appeal against 
this decision before the Public Prosecution Office. 
C. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROSECUTE SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
AS A WAR CRIME AND AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY IN 
COLOMBIA 
In Colombia, crimes of sexual violence have been recognized as 
war crimes and crimes against humanity under different legal 
regimes. The Colombian Criminal Code (Law 599 of 2000) 
expressly lists crimes of sexual violence as war crimes.137  In 
addition, Law 1719 of 2014 on Access to Justice for Victims of 
Sexual Violence−a law aimed at reducing impunity for sexual 
of the sterilizations). 
 135.  See José A. Burneo Labrín, Esterilización Forzada en el Perú: Delito de 
Lesa Humanidad, Estudio para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer, DEMUS 
(2008), https://1996pnsrpf2000.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/demus-esterilizacic 
3b3n-forzada-en-el-perc3ba-delito-de-lesa-humanidad.pdf; see also Peru Reopens 
Criminal Investigation Into Mass Forced Sterilizations, CENTER FOR 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (May 13, 2015), http://www.reproductiverights.org/press-
room/peru-reopens-criminal-investigation-into-mass-forced-sterilizations; see also 
Mestanza Chávez v Peru, Case 12.181, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
71/03, OEA/Ser.L., Friendly Settlement (2003), http://www.cidh.oas.org/ 
annualrep/2003 eng/Peru.12191.htm. 
 136.  Dan Collyns, Women vow to fight on in Peru after Alberto Fujimori 
absolved over forced sterilisations, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.the 
guardian.com/global-development/2016/aug/03/women-vow-to-fight-on-in-peru-
after-fujimori-absolved-over-forced-sterilisations?CMP=twt_gu. 
 137.  599 C. PEN. titulo II (2000); see De las Normas Rectoras de la Ley Penal 
Colombiana, 100 C. PEN. art. 1 (1980) (citing to law that was in force before the 
adoption of the 2000 Criminal Code). 
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violence and at guaranteeing the rights of victims−expanded these 
war crime provisions to include a fuller list of sexual violence 
crimes.138 However, the recognition of sexual violence as a crime 
against humanity has been recent and controversial, and has required 
a flexible interpretation of the Criminal Code, as this Code does not 
contain a provision on crimes against humanity.139 An important 
amendment introduced by Law 1719 in this respect was the 
requirement that judges declare that sexual violence amounts to a 
crime against humanity in their cases when the contextual elements 
of these crimes are met.140 For this purpose, these contextual 
elements are interpreted in accordance with the Rome Statute.141 
Arguably, this imposes an implicit duty on prosecutors to charge 
sexual violence as a crime against humanity when the elements for 
these crimes are satisfied.142 This does not mean that Law 1719 
incorporated crimes against humanity into the Criminal Code, nor 
that an accused person can be convicted for crimes against humanity. 
Rather, it means that prosecutors must charge crimes under the 
individual war crimes categories in the Criminal Code and can 
request that the judge declare that those crimes also amount to crimes 
against humanity. Colombian courts have accepted this practice and 
have held that a sexual violence crime perpetrated in the context of 
 138.  See L. 1719 arts. 2-10, junio 18, 2014, 49 Diario Oficial [D.O.] (Colom.) 
(introducing the following war crimes: abusive rape on minors under the age of 14; 
sexual acts with minors under the age of 14; sexual slavery; forced prostitution; 
trafficking for sexual exploitation; forced sterilization; forced pregnancy; and 
forced nudity). 
 139.  However, in different sections, the Criminal Code lists certain categories 
of crimes recognized as crimes against humanity in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, 
such torture (article 178), murder (article 103), enforced disappearance (article 
165), and forced displacement (article 180). None of these provisions require that 
the crimes must take place in the context of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population. See Delitos contra Personas y Bienes Protegidos por 
el Derecho Internacional Humanitario, 599 C. PEN. arts. 103, 165, 178, 180 (2000). 
But see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (recognizing specific crimes as 
crimes against humanity). 
 140.  See L. 1719, art. 15. 
 141.  See id. 
 142.  Compare L. 1719, art. 15 (stating that prosecutors must prove that the acts 
were committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack), with Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a) 
(requiring the attack to be carried out “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy”). 
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the conflict can amount to both a war crime and a crime against 
humanity.143 
To prove that an act of sexual violence amounts to a war crime, 
Colombian prosecutors must demonstrate that the act of sexual 
violence was committed against a protected person under 
international humanitarian law and that it was closely related to the 
armed conflict.144  To establish the protected status of victims, 
prosecutors are required to show that the victims were civilians or 
persons not taking an active part in the hostilities.145 Given that 
sexual violence is prohibited in any circumstance, the Attorney 
General’s Office has acknowledged its duty to investigate cases of 
sexual violence against any individual, regardless of their status.146 
This is significant because different armed groups have been accused 
of perpetrating sexual violence against female combatants and child 
soldiers within their ranks.147 
To meet the conflict nexus requirement, prosecutors have had to 
 143.  See Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 754-58; see also Mancuso 
Judgment, supra note 69, ¶¶ 1316-20; see also Peña Tobón Judgment, supra note 
62, ¶¶ 82-103. 
 144.  Prosecutors are not required to prove that the accused had knowledge of 
this connection, which is a legal requirement under international criminal law. 
Proving the existence of an armed conflict is straightforward, as the Supreme 
Court has declared it a fact of common knowledge. See 2016 Sexual Violence 
Protocol, supra note 67, ¶ 218. 
 145.  See C. PEN. 2000, art. 135 (stating that the category of “protected persons” 
includes civilians, persons not taking active part in the hostilities, civilians in the 
power of the opposing side, persons hors de combat, as well as other persons 
recognized as such in the 1949 IV Geneva Convention and in the 1977 Additional 
Protocols I and II); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 1977 art. 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (providing fundamental guarantees for 
persons not taking an active part in the hostilities); see also Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135 (defining “protected person”); see generally 2016 Sexual 
Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶¶ 221-23. 
 146.  In this respect, the Attorney General’s Office has recognized that sexual 
violence is prohibited in all circumstances in armed conflict, regardless of the 
status of the victims. See Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶ 223; see also 
Arroyo Ojeda Judgment, supra note 76, 567 (indicating that, on the basis of the 
evidence, the prosecution should have charged the rape of a girl child soldier by a 
member of her own armed group). 
 147.  See Luis Andrés Fajardo Arturo & Rosa Yineth Valoyes Valoyes, 
Violencia Sexual como Crímen Internacional Perpetrado por las FARC 18 (2015). 
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accurately contextualize the crimes and make the connection 
between the crime and the broader context of violence in which it 
took place. The Niño Balaguera et al case illustrates the importance 
of viewing the crimes in context.148 The case concerned two former 
members of the paramilitary group known as the Black Eagles. They 
were accused of abducting, raping and torturing a woman, after 
murdering members of her family. In its November 2014 decision on 
appeal, the Supreme Court’s Criminal Chamber overturned a ruling 
from a lower court that had failed to find that the crimes amounted to 
war crimes.149 The Chamber examined the broader context of 
violence in which the crimes occurred to establish the conflict nexus 
requirement. Following the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, the Chamber found that the armed conflict played 
a substantial part in the perpetrators’ ability to commit the crimes,150 
in their decision to commit the crimes,151 in the manner in which 
these were perpetrated152 and in the purpose of the violence.153 It 
concluded that the prosecution had correctly charged the crimes as 
war crimes, and convicted both accused for these crimes, increasing 
their sentences. 
To establish the contextual elements for both war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, prosecutors have focused on cases in which 
they are able to demonstrate the existence of a pattern of violence 
 148.  Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación 
Penal, noviembre 12, 2014, M.P: F. Caballero, Radicación No. 39392, 19 
(Colom.). 
 149.  See id. at 5 (concluding that the prosecution had incorrectly charged the 
crimes as war crimes rather than as ordinary crimes, and basing its decision on the 
fact that the victim and her family were not directly engaged in the hostilities at the 
time of the crimes, reasoning that they were therefore not protected persons).   
 150.  See id. at 56-57 (finding that their membership in the paramilitary group 
had allowed the perpetrators to commit the crimes, as the paramilitary group 
exercised control over the region where the crimes were perpetrated and over the 
civilian population, including the women).   
 151.  See id. at 55-56. Due to the conflict, the perpetrators were in a position of 
power over the victim; this factor was decisive in their ability to carry out the 
crimes. 
 152.  See id. at 59. The accused perpetrated the acts of sexual violence on the 
victim after murdering members of her family. Given the coercive circumstances 
surrounding the sexual violence, the victim was unable to consent to these acts. 
 153.  See id. at 56-57. The perpetrators acted pursuant to an order of a superior 
to intimidate the family of the victim. The accused took advantage of this situation 
to kidnap, torture and rape the victim.  
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and show that charged incidents of sexual violence are connected to 
the broader context of violence. Documenting patterns of violence 
has assisted prosecutors in identifying: the contexts in which the 
violence is committed; the manner in which the crimes were 
perpetrated; the connections between sexual violence and other 
human rights violations; the categories of victims; and the 
perpetrator groups.154 
With regard to certain acts of sexual violence as war crimes,155 
prosecutors are required to prove the violent nature of the act in order 
to show that the victim was incapable of genuinely consenting. 
Recent reforms have recognized that the violent nature of the sexual 
act can be established by the surrounding coercive circumstances. 
Specifically, Law 1719 defines the notion of “violence” in similar 
terms to the ICC’s definition of coercion in the context of rape.156 
Applying international standards, Law 1719 also states that consent 
cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a 
victim−where this consent is not voluntary and free−nor by reason of 
the silence or lack of resistance by a victim.157 In the case of children 
 154.  See 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶¶ 57, 59-60 
(highlighting the importance of contextualizing sexual violence to accurately 
characterize the crimes and to link the crimes to senior accused, and 
recommending that prosecutors move away from conducting single-incident 
investigations and focus on documenting patterns of violence); see also Vanoy 
Murillo Judgment, supra note 69, at 1262-64 (finding that the patterns of violence 
in the case demonstrate the contextual elements for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity). 
 155.  See C. PEN. 2000, arts. 138-41 (defining different war crime categories of 
sexual violence which require proof of violence: rape (art. 138), sexual slavery 
(art. 141A), forced sterilization (art. 139B), forced nudity (art. 139D), and forced 
abortion (art. 139E)). 
 156.  L. 1719, art. 11 (defining “violence” as: “the use of force; threat of force; 
physical or psychological coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence; duress; 
illegal detention; psychological oppression; abuse of power; taking advantage of a 
coercive environment or similar circumstances that prevent that the victim gives 
genuine consent:”); see Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International 
Criminal Court rs. 70-72, 2005, ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng [hereinafter ICC 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence] (stating that consent cannot be inferred through 
coercion); see also 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶ 231. 
 157.  See L. 1719, art. 18; see also Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional 
Court], mayo 2, 2015, Sentencia T-453/05, M.P.: M. J. Cepeda Espinosa, ¶ 6.3, 
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C] (Colom.) [hereinafter Orejana Troya 
Judgment] (holding that consent cannot be inferred from the prior sexual conduct 
of the victim). 
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under the age of 14, the law contains war crime provisions of 
statutory rape and of sexual acts on minors under the age of 14, as it 
is assumed that a child cannot consent to sexual conduct.158 This 
reinforced protection is important in the Colombian context, as 
children have been particularly vulnerable to sexual violence by 
armed actors.159 
As in the case of Peru, the application of the principle of legality 
has been an issue in dealing with past violations in Colombia. The 
2000 Criminal Code entered into force in July 2001 and, strictly 
speaking, cannot be applied to crimes committed before that period. 
However, in some cases dealing with crimes of non-sexual nature, 
such as killings of civilians, courts have adopted a flexible 
interpretation of the principle of legality.160 They have held that 
criminal conduct can be characterized as an international crime−for 
example as murder on protected person−provided that the violation 
in question constitutes an infringement of a rule of international 
 158.  See C. PEN. 2000, arts. 138-39 (defining crimes of rape on protected 
person under 14 years of age (art. 138A) and sexual acts on protected person under 
14 years of age (art.139A)); see also Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme 
Court], Sala de Casación Penal, septiembre 26, 2000, M.P: F. Ripoll, Proceso No. 
13466, 3-5, (Colom.) (holding that non-consent is inferred in cases of sexual 
violence against minors); see also 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶ 
234 (providing a more detailed analysis). 
 159.  See Auto 009, ¶¶ 3-3.2.2 But see C. PEN. 2000, art. 162. With regard to 
sexual violence against child soldiers, it should be noted that the Criminal Code 
contains a prohibition on the recruitment by armed groups of children under the 
age of 18 (art.162). However, the statutory rape provision only applies to those 
under the age of 14. 
 160.  This rule must be contained within a treaty ratified by Colombia in force at 
the time of the crimes. However, the sentence applied to the crime must be that set 
out in the criminal provisions in force at the time of its commission. Corte 
Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, mayo 15, 
2010, Radicación No. 33118, at 25-30 (Colom.) [hereinafter Cesar Pérez García]; 
Arroyo Ojeda Judgment, supra note 76, at 331; Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 
[Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala de Justicia y Paz, 110016000253200680281, 
Sentencia, December 2, 2010, ¶¶ 188, 198-202 [hereinafter Laverde Zapata 
Judgment]; Vanoy Murillo Judgment, supra note 69, at 232; Tribunal Superior del 
Distrito Judicial de Bogota [T. Sup.] [Superior Tribunal Court of the District of 
Bogota], Sala de Justicia y Paz, agosto 1, 2014, Radicación 11-001-60-002253-
2008-83201, at 16 (Colom.) [hereinafter Pestaña Coronado Judgement]; Tribunal 
Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogota [T. Sup.] [Superior Tribunal Court of the 
District of Bogota], Sala de Justicia y Paz, julio 30, 2012, Radicación 
110016000253200682222, at 136-37, 165 (Colom.) [hereinafter Giraldo Paniagua 
Judgment ]. 
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humanitarian law binding on Colombia.161 This interpretation is 
grounded on Articles 93 and 94 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution, 
which establish the primacy of international human rights treaties 
over the domestic legal order. Crimes can therefore be adjudicated as 
international crimes even if they were not recognized as such in the 
domestic law in force when the crimes were committed. There is at 
least one precedent, the November 2014 Mancuso et al case 
discussed below, where the accused were found guilty for the crimes 
of rape and sexual slavery as war crimes although the crimes were 
committed before this conduct was characterized as a war crime in 
domestic law.162 
The application of the principle of legality can become an issue in 
relation to the new war crimes provisions introduced by Law 1719, 
as this law entered into force in June 2014 and does not provide for 
its retroactive application. The retroactive application of these new 
provisions will require a progressive interpretation of the prohibition 
against sexual violence under international law applicable to 
Colombia. 
In relation to different categories of crimes, courts in other Latin 
American countries have developed similar expansive interpretations 
of the principle of legality.163 They have recognized the importance 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  However, the tribunal did not provide reasons regarding the legal 
characterization of these crimes as war crimes. See Mancuso Judgment, supra note 
69, ¶¶ 2142-45, 2177-85, 2192-95, 2202-05, 2215-26, 2250-60, 8651-54, 8686-88; 
see also Camila Alejandra Hoyos Pulido & Maria Adelaida Palacio Puerta, 
APORTES DE LAS SENTENCIAS DE JUSTICIA Y PAZ A LOS DERECHOS DE LAS MUJERES 
38-40, 73-76 (Corporación Humanas, 2015) (providing an analysis of this 
decision). 
 163.  See Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal Federal No. 1 de la Plata [Federal 
Criminal Oral Tribunal No. 1 of La Plata], 19/9/2006, “Sentencia contra 
Etchocolatz por crímenes contra la humanidad” (Arg.), at 206-209 (finding that 
crimes in the case amount to crimes against humanity under international law, 
which has primacy over domestic law); see also Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] 
[Supreme Court], diciembre 13, 2006, “Caso Molco,” Rol de la causa: 559-2004, 
criminal, Estudios Constitucionales [E.S] p. 533, ¶ 16-17 (Chile) (stating that it is 
sufficient for international crimes to be recognized under international customary 
law at the time of their perpetration to entail criminal liability); Fujimori Judgment, 
supra note 108, ¶¶ 711, 714, 717; see also Juez Penal 19° Turno [Criminal Court 
19°], marzo 26, 2009, “Gavazzo Pereira, José Nino. Arab Fernandez, José Ricardo 
– Un Delito de Privación de Libertad,” Ficha 98-247/2006, ¶ 8 (Uruguay) 
[hereinafter Gavazzo Pereira Judgment] (finding that while domestic law does not 
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of examining gross human rights abuses through the lens of 
international law,164 and have taken into account the jurisprudence of 
international criminal tribunals in their assessment of crimes.165 
D. PROSECUTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS GENOCIDE IN GUATEMALA 
Sexual violence has been prosecuted as genocide in Guatemala. As 
noted above,166 in 2013, the High Risk Tribunal “A” found former 
president Ríos Montt guilty for the genocide of the Mayan Ixil 
population in various communities in 1982-1983. Although the 
Constitutional Court overturned this judgment a few days after it was 
issued, and the future of the case is currently uncertain, it remains an 
important precedent. 
recognize the crimes of torture and enforced disappearance, the criminality and 
punishability of these acts can be determined by international law). 
 164.  For example, in Argentina, courts have recognized the importance of 
examining grave human rights abuses from the perspective of crimes against 
humanity because they violate fundamental values of humanity. In the Julio Simón 
et al case, in declaring the unconstitutionality of the Final Stop and Due Obedience 
Laws −which prevented prosecutions for human rights abuses during the military 
regime, federal judge Cavallo held that: “the facts must be judged incorporating in 
the legal analysis those rules that the international community has developed in 
their respect, without which it would not be possible to assess the facts in their full 
dimension” and that “analyzing the facts exclusively from the perspective of the 
Criminal Code would mean ignoring or putting aside a legal toolkit developed by 
the consensus of nations especially for cases of extreme gravity as the present case. 
It would be a valid legal analysis, but, undoubtedly, partial or insufficient.” 
(unofficial translation). See Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y Correccional 
Federal 4 [Federal Criminal and Correctional Court No. 4], 6/3/2001, “Simon, 
Julio, Del Cerro, Juan Antonio s/sustracción de menores de 10 años,” 19, 
Biblioteca de los Derechos Humanos de la Universidad de Minnesota (Arg.). 
 165.  See, e.g., Court Criminal Federal de Santiago del Estero [Federal Criminal 
Court of Santiago del Estero], 03/05/2013, “Aliendro, Juana Agustine et al., re 
enforced disappearances, breaking and entering, and unlawful imprisonment,” 
Case No. 960/11, 11-12, 137-38, 199, 224 (Arg.) (examining the recognition of 
sexual violence crimes as crimes against humanity in ICTY jurisprudence); see 
Corte Federal de Tucumán [Federal Court of Tucuman], Judgment, 19/05/2011, 
“Fernández Juárez, María Lilia y Herrera, and Gustavo Enrique, re: unlawful 
imprisonment” (Villa Urquiza Prison), 43 (Arg.) (analyzing the elements of the 
crime of rape in ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence) (Argentina); see also Cámara 
Federal de Casación Penal [Federal Court of Criminal Appeals], 17/02/2012, “Case 
against Molina, Gregorio,” Case No. 12821, 66–69, 74 (Arg.) (discussing the 
chapeau requirements of crimes against humanity articulated in ICTY 
jurisprudence) (Argentina). 
 166.  See discussion infra Section II (D). 
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Relying on Article 376 of the Guatemalan Criminal Code, which 
defines the crime of genocide, the prosecution put forward charges of 
sexual violence as genocide by linking these crimes to a range of 
other violent acts carried out by Guatemalan military forces against 
the Mayan Ixil community.167 It argued that sexual violence had been 
one of the destructive means, together with other forms of violence, 
used by the military to inflict serious bodily and mental harm on this 
community.168 It also argued that, in the same manner as the other 
violent acts, the infliction of sexual violence had a destructive impact 
on the community and was carried out with the intent to destroy the 
community.169 
In its judgment, the tribunal found that the genocidal acts 
perpetrated by government forces took various forms, including 
killings, enforced disappearances, sexual violence against women 
and girls, torture, cruel and inhumane treatment, destruction of crops 
to induce starvation, and razing of civilian villages.170 The objective 
of this campaign was to eliminate the Mayan Ixil population, 
considered by the government to be the support base of the guerrilla 
and the internal enemy of the state.171 When assessing whether sexual 
violence formed part of the genocidal campaign, the tribunal 
reasoned that the crimes were carried out for a destructive purpose 
and targeted not only individual victims, but also the community: 
government forces systematically targeted Mayan Ixil women 
through rape and sexual slavery because they intended to destroy the 
 167.  See Human Rights Prosecution Office, Unit of Special Cases related to the 
Conflict, Indictment, Exp. MP001/2010/23251, C-01076-2011-00015, 27 March 
2012 [hereinafter “Ríos Montt Indictment”], Sections II.A (underlying acts of 
genocide) & IV (legal characterization and forms of responsibility) (relying on the 
jurisprudence of the international ad hoc tribunals, the prosecution also charged 
sexual violence as a form of torture under Article 378); see also Ríos Montt 
Indictment, A.2.2 (crimes of sexual violence and torture against women). 
 168.  Ríos Montt Indictment, Section II.A.2 (infliction of serious bodily and 
mental harm on the members of the ethnic Mayan Ixil group); Ríos Montt 
Judgment, supra note 27, at 9-11, 49-50, 68-71, 87-88. 
 169.  Ríos Montt Indictment, supra note 168, at Section II.A.2.a (harm through 
sexual violence); Ríos Montt Judgment, supra note 27, at 27-28, 34-35, 47, 71-73, 
89-92. 
 170.  Ríos Montt Judgment, supra note 27, at 108, 111, 113-14, 130, 137, 138, 
140, 141-43, 683-84, 688-89, 699. 
 171.  Id., at 103, 107-09. 
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fabric of the community.172 The tribunal acknowledged the 
intergenerational effect of sexual violence, as the women had the 
important role of passing on life, culture and traditions within the 
community.173 By targeting the women, these forces sought to 
destroy the entire community.174 In relation to Ríos Montt’s role in 
this campaign, the tribunal found that, as the then de facto president, 
he was directly involved in designing and implementing a series of 
military operations which provided the framework for the 
counterinsurgency campaign that led to the genocide.175 He had also 
failed to prevent or punish the crimes. The tribunal found that he had 
the required knowledge176 and intent177 to be held accountable for the 
crimes. Finally, the tribunal affirmed that acknowledging the truth 
about these crimes strengthened the rule of law and contributed to 
their non-repetition.178 
This judgment represents an important recognition of the role and 
purpose of sexual violence in the Guatemalan conflict. It also laid the 
groundwork for future prosecutions by providing a broader 
understanding of the conflict that includes the experiences of women. 
 172.  Id., at 131-34, 141-42, 689-90 (finding that the rapes and mutilations 
caused terror and physical and cultural destruction with the objective of 
eliminating the Maya Ixil ethnic group and noting that the military and operational 
plans indicated that the troops should have sexual access to Mayan women as “war 
booty”). 
 173.  Id., at 132-34, 142, 689-91 (finding that the killing of fetuses by soldiers 
supported its finding of intent to commit genocide, as unborn children were 
considered “a seed that must be destroyed”). 
 174.  Id., at 141-42, 690-91. 
 175.  Under Ríos Montt’s command, the Guatemalan army designed and carried 
out a series of military operations, including code-named Victoria 82, Firmeza 83, 
Sofia and Operation Ixil. Ríos Montt also authorized and implemented military and 
operational plans, and ordered the development of the National Plan for Security 
and Development (Plan Nacional de Seguridad y Desarrollo) and the Fundamental 
Statute of the State (Estatuto Fundamental de Gobierno). Id. at 104, 107-10, 694-
706. 
 176.  Ríos Montt Judgment, supra note 27,  at 105-7, 110, 694-95, 699-703 
(relying on military expert witnesses, among other sources, to find that, as the de 
facto head of state, Ríos Montt knew or should have known about the crimes. 
 177.   Id., at 111-12, 697, 699-700. 
 178.  Id., at 707. 
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E. ESTABLISHING LIABILITY FOR CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE 
In the case study countries, conflict-related prosecutions have 
primarily targeted physical perpetrators and low-level accused. 
However, in recent years, there has been a greater focus on 
prosecuting senior-level leaders who were not direct perpetrators, but 
who led, devised policies, ordered, or tolerated crimes.179 The cases 
against senior leadership have forced legal practitioners to confront 
the common misconception that only physical perpetrators can be 
held accountable for sexual violence.180 These cases have also 
underscored the importance of pursuing the criminal liability of a 
broad range of individuals whose responsibility can be established, 
instead of focusing exclusively on the physical perpetrators. 
When sexual violence is perpetrated in the context of gross human 
rights abuses and conflict, a challenge practitioners face is to obtain 
evidence on the identification of physical perpetrators. This can 
prove difficult because the victims and witnesses may not know the 
identity of those who committed the crimes. The traumatic nature of 
the events, the passage of time and the specific circumstances 
surrounding the crimes can also impact a victim’s ability to identify 
the perpetrators. For these reasons, requiring a victim to provide 
precise information on the identity of the physical perpetrators before 
acting on a complaint, as well as failing to take into account the 
liability of other persons involved in the crimes, can result in a denial 
 179.  In 2012, the Colombian Attorney General’s Office adopted a directive for 
the prioritization of conflict-related crimes. Among other things, it instructs 
prosecutors to focus on those bearing the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law. When interpreting the legality of this 
directive, the Constitutional Court examined the term “those bearing the greatest 
responsibility” in light of the practice of international and hybrid tribunals, and 
held that while the Attorney General’s directive focuses on prosecuting those in 
leadership positions, it does not imply that those who are not at that level do not 
bear any responsibility and cannot be pursued. See  Directiva 001, Fiscalía General 
de la Nación [Attorney General’s Office], 10/04/2012, (Colom.); see also Corte 
Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Aug. 28, 2012, Sentencia C-579/13, ¶ 8.2.3, 
(Colom.).   
 180.  2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶ 242 (recognizing that this 
misconception among prosecutors and investigators−that only direct perpetrators 
can be pursued for crimes of sexual violence−has significantly impeded 
accountability for these crimes). 
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of justice.181 
The Peruvian case of MMB illustrates this point.182  In October 
1992, members of the First Division of Military Special Forces 
kidnapped MMB, then a 19-year-old student. 183  They accused her of 
belonging to the Shining Path, beating and repeatedly raping her.184 
To get her to confess to certain activities, her captors threatened her 
and her family. She eventually confessed and was sentenced to 15 
years for terrorism.185 As a result of the rapes, she became pregnant 
and gave birth to a child in prison.186 
MMB consistently maintained that members of the Peruvian army 
had subjected her to physical and psychological torture, including 
rape, in detention.187 After making this complaint to the director of 
Chorrillos Prison, where she held on charges of terrorism, her case 
was referred to the Public Prosecutor for investigation.188 The Public 
Prosecutor found that the crime of rape had been established, noting 
that it was corroborated by a contemporaneous medical report.189 
However, the prosecutor later shelved the case because “it was not 
possible to fully identify the suspects of this crime [. . .] one of the 
elements of procedural due process, namely, the individualization of 
the author or authors of the crime committed, is lacking. . .”190 
Military authorities later also investigated MMB’s allegations, but 
dismissed the case due to lack of forensic evidence regarding the 
 181.  See, e.g., Diana Guarnizo Peralta, Fourth Follow-Up Report to Auto 092 of 
the Colombian Constitutional Court (2011) 38 (noting that in 2012, the Colombian 
Inspector General’s Office reported that complaints of sexual violence victims 
were often refused due to lack of information on the identity of the perpetrator). 
 182.  In criminal cases in Peru, victims of sexual violence are referred to by a 
pseudonym in order to protect their identity from the public. See Julieta Lemaitre, 
Violence, in 24 GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA – CASES AND 
DECISIONS 192-94 (Cristina Motta & Marcarena Saez eds., 2013) (providing a 
summary of the procedural background to the case). 
 183.  BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 112. 
 184.  CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 321. 
 185.  See, e.g., id. at 379; see BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 112. 
 186.  CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 382. 
 187.  LEMAITRE, supra note 182, at 193. 
 188.  Id. at 380. 
 189.  LEMAITRE, supra note 182, at 193 (quoting the medical report, which 
confirmed that “the prisoner filing the complaint is pregnant and, that as a result of 
these acts, has conceived a child[.]”). 
 190.  LEMAITRE, supra note 182, at 193-94; see also CVR Final Report, supra 
note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 380. 
 
KRAVETZ- FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2017  12:40 PM 
2017] PROMOTING DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY  753 
alleged rapes.191 She was eventually cleared of all terrorism charges 
and released.192 When the CVR investigated this case, it found that 
MMB had been illegally detained and subjected to torture while in 
detention, and it called for a full investigation into these events by 
the competent judicial authorities.193 
More than twenty years later, MMB is still seeking justice for 
these crimes. After numerous delays,194 the Public Prosecution 
opened an investigation into these crimes and eventually charged 
several senior members of the Peruvian military with the crimes of 
aggravated abduction and torture as crimes against humanity.195 In 
2014, the trial against these accused began before a criminal tribunal 
in Lima.196 The case is now in its final phase and is focused on 
establishing the responsibility not only of the physical perpetrators 
but also of those running the detention center where MMB was 
illegally detained and tortured.197 
In the case study countries, legal practitioners use different legal 
 191.  CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 380-81. Since the 
Military Justice Code in force at the time did not include the crime of rape, the 
military tribunal initiated an investigation for abuse of authority by military 
personnel. See LEMAITRE, supra note 182, at 193-94 (quoting the Examining 
Judge’s decision “that there is no proven criminal responsibility of military 
personnel of the Special Forces Division,” and basing his decision on the fact that 
a forensic report of the victim did not reveal any physical signs of the alleged 
rapes).   
 192.  See, e.g., CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 383; see 
Rosario Aronés C., Abren Juicio a diez militares por ultrajar a una mujer en 
calabozo, EL POPULAR (June 13, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.elpopular.pe/actualidad-y-policiales/2014-06-13-abren-juicio-diez-
militares-por-ultrajar-una-mujer-en-calabozo. 
 193.  CVR Final Report, supra note 11, Vol. VI, Ch. 1.5, 383-84. 
 194.  E.g., BOESTEN, supra note 4, at 112-13 (explaining the delays in the 
investigation of the case and the challenges faced by MMB in seeking justice); see 
Defensoría del Pueblo, El Estado frente a las víctimas de la violencia. Hacia dónde 
vamos en políticas de repación y justicia?, Informe Defensorial, N. 128, 160-61 
(2007); see also Salazar Luzula, supra note 45, 64-67 (discussing the general 
obstacles this case, as well as those in other similar cases of sexual violence). 
 195.  Among other things, the accused have argued that these charges should be 
dismissed because in 1992, crimes against humanity were not included in the 
criminal code. 
 196.  Aronés C., supra note 192; see Caso de María Magdalena Monteza 
Benavides, INSTITUTO DE DEMOCRACIA Y DERECHOSE HUMANOS (1992), 
http://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/comunicaciones/notas-informativas/caso-de-maria-
magdalena-monteza-benavides-1992 (summarizing the case).   
 197.   Aronés C., supra note 193. 
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frameworks to reflect the liability of senior leadership in sexual 
violence cases. In Colombia, co-perpetration and indirect 
perpetration are two modes of liability used in cases against senior 
leadership.198 Co-perpetration requires proving that a plurality of 
persons pursue a common criminal plan, and significantly contribute 
to this plan while sharing the intent for the crimes to be committed.199 
The accused are not required to have physically committed the act of 
sexual violence to be held liable as co-perpetrators, but need to have 
significantly contributed to its commission.200 Indirect perpetration 
refers to the commission of a crime through another person201 and 
focuses on establishing the liability of “the perpetrator behind the 
perpetrator”.202 As in other Latin American countries,203 in recent 
years, Colombian prosecutors have used indirect perpetration 
through organized structures of power to link crimes of subordinates 
to senior leaders. The underlying rationale of this mode of liability as 
 198.  See, e.g., 2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶243; see 599 C. 
PEN. Título II, art. 29 (2000). 
 199.  2016 Sexual Violence Protocol, supra note 67, ¶243(b). 
 200.  Id.  
 201.  See C. PEN., art. 29. 
 202.  In Colombia, this mode of liability has been developed on the basis of the 
legal doctrine originally developed by German jurist Claus Roxin. To establish 
liability on the basis of indirect perpetration requires showing the existence of a 
criminal organization, the control and authority exercised by accused over the 
criminal organization, the subordinates’ compliance with the orders of the accused, 
and the fungibility of the direct perpetrators. It also requires showing that the 
accused intended the commission of the crimes. The leader must use his/her 
control over the criminal organization to execute crimes, and must mobilize his/her 
authority and power within the organization to ensure the commission of these 
crimes. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de 
Casación Penal, febrero 23, 2010, No. 32805, 77-78 [hereinafter Garcia Romero 
Judgment]; see Tribunal Superior de Bogotá [Superior Tribunal of Bogotá], Sala 
de Justicia y Paz, Rad. 11-001-60-00 253-2006 810099, Hébert Veloza García, 
Oct. 30, 2013, ¶ 847-48, 859; see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 
303-04; see also generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on 
confirmation of charges, ¶ 495-518 (Sep. 30, 2008), 
http://www.worldcourts.com/icc/eng/decisions/2008.03.10_Prosecutor_v_ 
Katanga2.pdf (applying the indirect perpetration method at the ICC); see also 
HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO ALONSO, TRATADO DE AUTORÍA Y PARTICIPACIÓN EN DERECHO 
PENAL INTERNACIONAL 300 (2013). 
 203.  See, e.g., Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal Federal No. 1 de la Plata [Federal 
Criminal Oral Tribunal No. 1 of La Plata], ‘Camps Circuit’ and others (Miguel 
Osvaldo Etchecolatz), Case No. 2251/06, septiembre 19, 2006, 200-03 
(Argentina); see Gavazzo Pereira Judgment, supra note 163, ¶ 6; see also Fujimori 
Judgment, supra note 108, ¶¶ 723-48. 
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applied in Colombian jurisprudence is that the perpetrator behind the 
direct perpetrator is responsible because he/she controls the 
organization that carries out the crimes and uses his/her authority and 
power over this organization to secure the commission of the crimes. 
The leadership of the criminal organization is therefore liable as the 
principal, rather than as an accessory. 
Several cases prosecuted under the transitional justice system have 
applied indirect perpetration to connect senior-level accused to 
crimes of sexual violence by subordinates.204 For example, in both 
the Villa Zapata et al and Mancuso et al cases, the Superior Tribunal 
of Bogotá applied indirect perpetration through organized structures 
of powers to hold paramilitary leaders accountable for sexual 
violence by subordinates for making use of the organization they 
controlled to commit the crimes.205 The Villa Zapata et al case 
concerns crimes perpetrated by the Bloque Vencedores de Arauca of 
the AUC in the Arauca region, in northern Colombia. Among other 
criminal acts, this armed group perpetrated different forms of sexual 
and gender-based violence against women and girls, both within their 
ranks and against civilians.206 The accused were eight members of 
this armed group. Orlando Villa Zapata, one of the commanders of 
this group, was found guilty as an indirect perpetrator for crimes 
committed by his subordinates. The tribunal found that in his 
leadership role, he issued orders and designed, promoted and 
implemented policies of violence and terror against civilians that led 
to the crimes, including the sexual violence.207 The Mancuso et al 
 204.  See, e.g., Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60; Mancuso Judgment, supra 
note 69; Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67; Fierro Flores Judgment, supra 
note 76. 
 205.  As noted above, convictions in the transitional justice system are based on 
admissions of guilt by the accused.   
 206.  See Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 784-93, 881-904, 907-08, 
913, 918-20, 922, 924-28, 930-39 (containing an extensive analysis of gender-
based violence in conflict); see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, at ¶¶ 
583-635, 758-61 (examining the crimes of femicide and enforced disappearance 
based on gender); see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 680-717, 782-
89 (examining the treatment of sexual and gender-based violence in international 
humanitarian, human rights and criminal law); see generally Villa Zapata 
Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 566-82 (referring to the different forms of sexual and 
gender-based violence in conflict). 
 207.  Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 414-18, 423-24 (referring to the 
elements of indirect perpetration under Colombian jurisprudence); Villa Zapata 
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case concerned twelve senior members of the AUC charged with 
crimes perpetrated by this paramilitary group in eight regions of 
Colombia. These crimes included 175 incidents of sexual and 
gender-based violence against both female and male victims.208 The 
tribunal found that the AUC used different criminal means to gain 
territorial control and strategic advantages, and to impose their rule 
upon the local population.209 In particular, they used sexual and 
gender-based violence to sow terror, inflict revenge on adversaries, 
exploit victims, and destroy the social fabric of communities.210 
Salvatore Mancuso, one of the top leaders of the AUC, 211 was found 
guilty for these crimes because, in his leadership role, he issued and 
implemented policies that resulted in these crimes.212 
In Peru, prosecutors have also relied on indirect perpetration as a 
mode of liability to hold senior-level leaders accountable for crimes 
of subordinates.213 In the Chumbivilcas, Los Cabitos and Manta and 
Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 440-67, 879, 886, 911, 923, 933, 942 (examining 
Villa Zapata’s responsibility as an indirect perpetrator based on his leadership role 
in the paramilitary group and his role in issuing orders to further the criminal goals 
of this armed group); Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, ¶¶ 459-61 (finding 
that Villa Zapata had knowledge that some of his subordinates were perpetrating 
sexual violence as these crimes were of common knowledge); see OLÁSOLO 
ALONSO, supra note 202, at 288 (indicating that in Colombian jurisprudence, to 
incur liability as an indirect perpetrator in the context of a campaign of mass 
atrocities, it is not required to show that the senior-level leader issued precise 
orders to his/her subordinates to commit the crimes; it is sufficient to show that 
he/she provided general instructions or guidelines regarding the implementation of 
this campaign, for example by identifying the targeted population of this violence). 
 208.  See Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69, ¶¶ 112, 1306, 2147-2958 
(including the crimes of rape, sexual slavery, torture and forced abortion). 
 209.  Id. ¶¶ 412, 574. 
 210.  Id. ¶¶ 412, 1290-1306. 
 211.  Id., 121, 125, 133. In 2008, Mancuso and other paramilitary leaders were 
extradited to the US to face drug trafficking charges. He is currently serving a 15-
year sentence at a US prison. He has participated in transitional justice proceedings 
in Colombia via video link. 
 212.  Id. ¶¶ 1450-51, 8587-91, 8593, 8652 (adding that he failed to exercise 
control over his subordinates to prevent the crimes, but failing to explain why he 
was held liable as an indirect perpetrator for his failure to act); Fierro Flores 
Judgment, supra note 76, ¶ 647 (convicting the accused, a paramilitary 
commander, as an indirect perpetrator for the crime of rape for failing to exercise 
control over one of his subordinates to prevent crimes, and finding that, rather than 
disciplining the perpetrator, Fierro Flores kept him within the ranks of his armed 
group despite his criminal propensity and drug consumption). 
 213.  See, e.g., Fujimori Judgment, supra note 108, ¶¶ 723-48 (discussing the 
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Vilca cases mentioned above, prosecutors have brought charges 
against senior military leaders on the basis of indirect perpetration.214 
For example, in the revised indictment in the Chumbivilcas case, one 
of the accused, Jaime Pando Navarrete, former commander of the 
military base in Antabamba, was charged as an indirect perpetrator 
through organized structures of power for the crimes of enforced 
disappearance, serious bodily harm resulting in death, sexual 
violence and murder. He exercised his authority over the military 
personnel at this base and, in this position of authority, he planned, 
organized, issued directives and implemented counterinsurgency 
programs that led to the commission of the crimes by his 
subordinates.215 As noted above, these trials have not yet been 
completed. 
There has been a tendency among Peruvian prosecutors to apply 
indirect perpetration in cases involving persons in positions of 
leadership without adequately establishing the required connections 
between the crimes and the accused (for example without 
establishing the link between the physical perpetrators and the senior 
leader). Also, in some cases, courts have applied more stringent 
standards, for instance by requiring evidence of orders by the 
accused to the perpetrators to commit crimes.216 Clear evidentiary 
and legal strategies are needed to ensure that the evidence adduced 
against senior leaders is capable of satisfying the mode of liability 
charged. 
In both Peru and Colombia, accused persons can be held liable for 
application of the indirect perpetration as a mode of liability in Peru); see C. PEN. 
art. 23 [Peru] (addresses indirect perpetration in the following language: “Any 
person who carries out the punishable act, by himself or through another, and those 
who commit it jointly. . .”); see also Aimee Sullivan, The Judgment Against 
Fujimori for Human Rights Violations, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 4, 678-80 (2010) 
(explaining the findings in the Fujimori case regarding his liability as an indirect 
perpetrator). 
 214.  These cases also include charges of commission against the physical 
perpetrators of the crimes. 
 215.  Fiscalía Superior Nacional [National Prosecution Office], Exp. No. 037-
2008, Resolución de ampliación de acusación, 2 septiembre 2013, 6-13. 
 216.  See, e.g., Sala Penal Nacional [National Criminal Chamber], Adrián 
Roman Fernandez y César Eduardo Espejo Lopez, Exp. No. 40-2013-0-5001-SP-
PE-01, Sentencia, enero 19, 2016 (acquitting two military officers of the charges of 
aggravated murder and enforced disappearance as indirect perpetrators due to the 
absence of evidence of orders to commit the crimes). 
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their omissions if their active involvement in the crimes cannot be 
proved.217  This liability is grounded on the duty of political and 
military leaders to act to protect an endangered legal interest (for 
example to protect the civilian population), their ability to act, and 
their failure to do so. The criminal codes in these countries do not 
recognize command responsibility, which is a specific form of 
omission liability and, under international customary law, can be 
applied where a superior failed to prevent or punish crimes 
committed by subordinates.218 More progressive approaches to 
interpreting omission liability are required so that the full extent of 
the responsibility of senior leaders is reflected in the cases under 
investigation. 
Finally, in Guatemala, the criminal code recognizes two broad 
categories of liability: commission and accomplice liability.219 
Article 36 sets out the different forms of commission. Command 
responsibility−as defined in international law−is not explicitly 
incorporated in the Guatemalan Criminal Code. 
In the Sepur Zarco case, both accused were found guilty for 
commission under Article 36, for their acts and omissions. In relation 
 217.  See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [Supreme Court of Justice], 
Corregimiento La Gabarra, Recurso de Casación, Radicación 24448, MP. A. J. 
Ibáñez Guzmán, septiembre 12, 2007, Section II (Colom.) (finding the accused had 
the duty to protect the civilian population of La Gabarra but failed to prevent the 
paramilitary attack on this locality despite having the ability to do so); see Corte 
Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Sentencia SU-1184 de 2001, M.P. E. 
Montealegre Lynett, noviembre 13, 2001, ¶¶ 17-18 (finding that under the 
Constitution, the armed forces have the legal duty to act to prevent violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law). 
 218.  When examining the legality of the legislation implementing the Rome 
Statute, the Constitutional Court examined the domestic applicability of command 
responsibility as set out in Article 28 of the Rome Statute in Colombia. It held that 
Colombian jurisprudence recognizes that military commanders have the duty to act 
to prevent serious international crimes and that they can incur criminal liability for 
failing to act. It therefore found that domestic jurisprudence has established that 
military commanders can be held liable for their omissions, and that Article 28 is 
not incompatible with this jurisprudence. Corte Constitucional [Constitutional 
Court], Revisión constitucional del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal 
Internacional – Revisión de la Ley 742 del 5 de junio de 2002 “Por medio de la 
cual se aprueba el Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Penal Internacional, hecho en 
Roma el día diecisiete (17) de julio de mil novecientos noventa y ocho (1998)”, 
Sentencia C-578/02, Expediente LAT-223, M.P.: E. Cifuentes Muñoz, julio 30, 
2002, Section 6.2. 
 219.  Guatemalan Crim. Code (Decree 17/73), art. 35.  
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to one of the accused, Reyes Girón, the tribunal found that, as the 
then commander of the Sepur Zarco military base, he was in charge 
of the base and of the soldiers responsible for the crimes, had 
extensive knowledge of the crimes, and took no action to prevent 
them.220 In this role, he had the duty to protect the civilian 
population, but instead chose to allow their rights to be grossly 
violated. Reyes Girón could have ordered the soldiers to respect the 
women in the community and could have prevented the rapes and 
sexual slavery, but failed to do so.221  The tribunal reasoned that by 
failing to act and by supporting the criminal conduct of his 
subordinates, Reyes Girón was liable for commission.222  The 
tribunal rejected the defence’s claims that the crimes were outside 
the control and powers of the accused.223 The tribunal followed 
similar reasoning with respect to Valdez Asig, the former military 
commissioner in the area.224 
The above-mentioned cases against high-level leaders provide 
insights into the role sexual violence played in the mass atrocity 
campaigns unleashed by armed actors in the different conflicts. They 
also show how the failure of senior leadership to respond to these 
crimes encourages further criminality and entrenches a culture of 
impunity. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The prosecution efforts and successful outcomes in sexual 
violence cases in the case study countries set influential precedents to 
promote accountability at the domestic level, providing key lessons 
to practitioners in other national systems. To accurately convey the 
purpose and characteristics of sexual violence in the respective 
conflicts, practitioners are applying the international law framework 
domestically. In Colombia, practitioners are using international law 
to interpret criminal provisions, to charge different forms of sexual 
violence, and to reflect the connections between sexual violence and 
 220.  Sepur Zarco Judgment, supra note 36, 490-93. 
 221.  Id. 492-93. 
 222.  Id. (finding both accused guilty under Article 36 ¶1 and ¶3 of the Criminal 
Code for participating in the commission of the crimes and for significantly 
contributing to their commission).   
 223.  Id. 491-92. 
 224.  Id. 491-93. 
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the broader context of violence. In Peru, practitioners are applying 
international law to capture the gravity and role of this violence in 
the charges and to navigate the statute of limitations. In Guatemala, 
practitioners are relying on international law to flesh out and apply 
criminal provisions to include sexual violence, and to advocate that 
sexual violence was an integral part of a genocidal campaign.  These 
examples show the importance of harmonizing domestic and 
international rules to appropriately prosecute international crimes. 
Practitioners are making progress in holding high-level leaders 
accountable for sexual violence by subordinates. To do so, they have 
had to develop appropriate investigative and legal strategies to 
establish the link between the actions or inactions of accused and the 
crimes. Depending on the mode of liability used, practitioners have 
focused on obtaining evidence relevant to the accused’s position and 
relationship with the perpetrators, the authority and powers of the 
accused, the accused’s attitude towards and awareness of the crimes, 
and the chains of command and reporting systems in place. 
Establishing patterns of violence has served to identify the manner in 
which the crimes were perpetrated, the categories of victims and the 
perpetrator groups, as well the organized and coordinated nature of 
this violence. This has in turn contributed to establishing the required 
connections between the crimes and the high-level leaders. The cases 
against senior officials discussed above have demonstrated the 
strategic use of sexual violence in these conflicts. 
Finally, the experiences of the case study countries show that 
criminal trials remain a key demand of victims. Through their 
perseverance and advocacy, victims have brought down the barriers 
to the domestic remedies for human rights abuses in their respective 
countries. However, while the prosecution of these abuses has been 
an important component of transitional justice efforts, it has not been 
the only component. Measures aimed at truth telling, and at repairing 
or redressing the impact of the harm caused to the victims and their 
communities have been equally relevant. As discussed above, in the 
three countries, truth-telling and historical memory processes 
preceded the prosecution of crimes. These processes surfaced the 
gendered dimensions of the conflicts in each country, acknowledging 
neglected abuses and providing a forum for victims to share their 
experiences of conflict. These processes also strengthened the 
determination of victims to take their cases to court, and influenced 
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the priority given in the context of criminal trials to reparations and 
redress for victims. For example, to preserve the memory of the 
crimes and educate the public, the Sepur Zarco tribunal ordered, 
among other measures, that educational textbooks and study 
programs include references to the stories of the women of Sepur 
Zarco, and that the local municipality build a monument in 
recognition of their efforts to seek justice.225 In Colombia, judgments 
issued under the transitional justice system have similarly included 
varied forms of redress for victims.226 These different measures have 
contributed to the creation of a historical record regarding past 
abuses and to a public understanding of the crimes and their impact 
in the affected communities. These measures also serve to promote 
the non-repetition of violence. 
National systems remain the principle venue for holding 
individuals accountable for international crimes, including those 
relating to sexual violence.227 As in the case study countries, national 
legal systems in other regions are playing an increasingly crucial role 
in delivering accountability for international crimes and in bridging 
the impunity gap where international courts cannot or will not 
 225.  Id. 510-11. 
 226.  See, e.g., Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, at 952-53 (ordering 
the Unit for Assistance and Reparations for Victims (UARIV) to implement 
different forms of reparations); see Triana Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, at 
954 (instructing the National Center for Historical Memory to document crimes 
perpetrated in the region of Magdalena Medio during the conflict); see also Triana 
Mahecha Judgment, supra note 67, at 957 (instructing the National Center for 
Historical Memory and the UARIV to identify the LGBT population affected by 
the conflict and to develop an integral reparation programs); see also Villa Zapata 
Judgment, supra note 60, 1028 (ordering the creation of a museum to 
commemorate the victims and prevent the repetition of crimes); see also Villa 
Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, 1046 (recognizing the right of victims to financial 
reparations); see also Villa Zapata Judgment, supra note 60, 1046-50 (ordering 
different state institutions to provide psychosocial, educational and medical 
support to the victims, as well as financial assistance to victim communities); see 
also Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69, 2258 (instructing different government 
agencies to implement an integral program to support female and male survivors of 
sexual violence); see also Mancuso Judgment, supra note 69, 2259 (instructing the 
national and regional offices of the Ministry of Education to implement 
educational campaigns in the affected regions to give visibility to gender-based 
violence in the conflict and its impact on victims). 
 227.  U.N. Secretary-General, Sexual Violence in Conflict, ¶ 111, U.N. Doc. 
A/67/792-S/2013/149 (March 14, 2013). 
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reach.228  By facing up to a violent past, these countries are slowly 
establishing a culture of legal justice in the aftermath of mass 
atrocities. 
 
 228.  See Kim Thuy Seelinger, Domestic Accountability for Sexual Violence: 
The Potential of Specialized Units in Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda, 96 
INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 534, 593-64 (2014) (highlighting the challenges in 
addressing conflict-related sexual violence crimes at the domestic level and 
proposing measures to overcome them). ), 96), 539–564, at 540. 
 
